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I. INTRODUCTION
Class action named plaintiffs and their lawyers inhabit a unique
position in U.S. jurisprudence. Authorized by federal and state rules to
advocate on behalf of thousands, sometimes millions, of unidentified
class members, they have the potential to wield considerable power and
influence over named defendants as well as non-party corporations in a
particular industry who choose to alter their behavior rather than face a
similar lawsuit. The inherent power of the class action and its potential
to provide broad-base relief to large numbers of persons influences the
attitudes and behavior of plaintiffs’ lawyers and named plaintiffs alike,
creating a dynamic between the two far different than what is seen in
typical individual cases.
Although class action lawsuits have been the subject of much
scholarly research, the vast majority of that work has focused on the
history and procedural aspects of class actions, narratives of particular
cases, and debates surrounding their utility, cost, and the compensation
of the lawyers who litigate them.1 Little scholarly attention, however,

1. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION (1987); DEBRA R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000) [hereinafter HENSLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS]; John C.
Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance”
to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 50 VAND. L. REV. 995 (2005);
John Kilwein, Still Trying: Cause Lawyering for the Poor and Disadvantaged in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES 181 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); Scott Barclay & Anna-Maria
Marshall, Supporting a Cause, Developing a Movement, and Consolidating a Practice: Cause
Lawyers and Sexual Orientation Litigation in Vermont, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE:
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has been paid to the comparative expectations and attitudes of lawyers
and clients who actually participate in class actions.2 And while the
study of client and lawyer attitudes toward the litigation of individual
disputes has been extensively analyzed, scant attention has been directed
to the applicability of this voluminous research to class actions.
This article begins to fill these significant voids. Through a series
of semi-structured interviews, it examines the expectations and attitudes
of plaintiffs’ lawyers and named plaintiffs in consumer protection class
actions: why they filed the lawsuit, and whether their goals changed
over time; the reasons for their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the
result in the case; and—regardless of the result—whether they felt that
the litigation process itself was fair. The results of these interviews are
then analyzed in order to determine whether they comport with two
theories central to studies of the litigation process:
dispute
transformation and procedural justice. More specifically, this article
analyzes the degree to which consumer class action plaintiffs’ lawyers
engage in the same kind of dispute transformation with representative
plaintiffs that is well-documented in the literature involving individual
litigants. It also investigates whether named plaintiffs (and the lawyers
who represent them) exhibit the same attitudes toward process fairness
that is well documented in the procedural justice literature pertaining to
individual disputants. Moreover, given the politically progressive nature
of much consumer protection litigation, this article examines the
attitudes of class action participants through the frame of the cause
lawyering literature. While the study focused on the participants in
consumer class actions, many of its conclusions can be generalized to
class actions more generally.
This study’s findings include the following:
• An intriguing twist on the doctrine of dispute
transformation. The typical model of such transformation,
applied to disputes between individual parties, sees lawyers

STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE 171 (Austin Sarat& Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005)
[hereinafter THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE].
2. One notable exception to this lacuna is Bryant Garth’s excellent 1992 study of plaintiffs’
lawyers and named plaintiffs in thirty-seven class actions closed in the Northern District of
California from 1979 to 1984. See Bryant Garth, Power and Legal Artifice: The Federal Class
Action, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237 (1992) [hereinafter Garth, Power and Legal Artifice]. Garth’s
rich study focused on seven case studies of different types of federal class actions (antitrust,
government benefits, and employment discrimination) to explore the extent to which named
plaintiffs are empowered by their experience. The current study focuses on consumer protection
class actions and is more concerned with the comparative attitudes of plaintiffs’ lawyers and named
plaintiffs toward their particular case and the class action process generally.
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deflating the unrealistic expectations of their clients,
minimizing them to the limited form of relief the legal
system can deliver (usually monetary damages).3 In
contrast, as this article demonstrates, consumer class action
lawyers often deliberately inflate the expectations of their
clients, encouraging them to look beyond individual
monetary compensation and focus instead on relief for the
entire class, which sometimes includes non-monetary
awards. In this way, class action lawyers do more than
merely manage their client’s expectations, a welldocumented process in individual litigation. Instead, they
consciously urge their clients to expand those expectations.
If their clients refuse to be so encouraged, the lawyers opt
not to include them as named plaintiffs.
Named plaintiffs bring a broad and complex array of
motivations and expectations to their role. This is partly
the result of their lawyers’ transformational efforts noted
above. Thus, most named plaintiffs in this study desired
both individual and collective forms of justice, including
monetary relief for themselves and the entire class,
assurances that the defendant would cease its offending
conduct, and some sense that justice had been done. But
many named plaintiffs are looking for more: they hope,
and frequently expect, that the class action to which they
aligned themselves would demonstrate that the defendant
was wrong and, by extension, change the behavior of actors
throughout a particular industry. These broad expectations
were more ambitious than those of most of the lawyers in
the study, whose goals centered on relief strictly available
through the class action mechanism, i.e., monetary
damages and injunctions directed against the particular
defendant in the lawsuit.
The named plaintiffs also exhibited a wide and complex
array of reasons for their feeling of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with the result of their class action. Nearly
all of the cases discussed in this study yielded settlements

3. William Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 645-47 (1980-1981); AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM
FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS 53-59 (1995). See generally JAMES BOYD
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990)
[hereinafter WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION].
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requiring monetary payouts or specific performance by the
defendant. While most of the named plaintiffs expressed
satisfaction because of these concrete settlement terms,
many also cited other reasons for satisfaction, including
proving that the defendant was wrong and the plaintiffs
were right, changing corporate behavior throughout the
relevant industry, and helping non-profit organizations
through cy pres awards. This nearly uniform sense of
satisfaction with the case result contrasts with the empirical
research on individual cases, which has demonstrated that
despite their recovery of monetary damages, many
individual plaintiffs are nevertheless disappointed because
their “extra-legal” goals (apologies, public accounting, and
the like) remain unfulfilled.4 The named plaintiffs in this
study were satisfied for a number of reasons, including the
fulfillment of “extra-legal” goals.
The named plaintiffs equated fairness with result. In
contrast to literature on process fairness, this study reveals
little correlation between named plaintiffs’ involvement
with, or control over, the lawsuit and their satisfaction with
the result and assessment of the fairness of the process. On
the contrary, even named plaintiffs who described a sense
of detachment from the lawsuit nevertheless expressed
significant personal satisfaction about the experience.
They also tended to base their assessment of process
fairness on the performance of their lawyers. These
findings contradict central aspects of the procedural justice
and process control theories, which post that clients
evaluate fairness and result separately, and are more
satisfied with disputing systems that permit them greater
control.5 I found no such correlation in this study. Instead,
the majority of named plaintiffs interviewed evaluated the
fairness of the process according to the result in the case.

4. Tamara Relis, It's Not About the Money!: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs'
Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT L. REV. 701, 705, 706 (2006) [hereinafter Relis, It's Not About the
Money!];See also TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS AND GENDERED PARTIES (2009)[hereinafter RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN
LITIGATION AND MEDIATION].
5. See generally John Thibault & Laurens Walker et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974).
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The named plaintiffs felt a sense of empowerment
regardless of their level of involvement with the case. This
contradicts one of the core findings in Bryant Garth’s study
of class actions nearly two decades ago.6 Among other
things, Garth found that class actions can be empowering
for the named plaintiff, depending on the type of case and
the level of client involvement with the litigation.7 My data
reveals that for named plaintiffs in consumer class actions,
a group which Garth’s study did not examine,
empowerment may have more to do with how clients
perceive the lawsuit and what it hopes to accomplish than
the client’s role within it.
The class action plaintiffs’ lawyers in this study conflated
client and cause. Much cause lawyering literature probes
the conflict between a cause lawyers’ duties to her
individual client and her devotion to the larger cause she
hopes to serve through that client.8 The lawyers in this
study effectively eliminate any such conflict by consciously
seeking out named plaintiffs already devoted to the cause,
or who are willing to be convinced to do so.
The class action lawyers were generally aware of their
clients’ collective justice goals. Studies of lawyers and
clients in individual cases suggest that lawyers for both
plaintiffs and defendants believe that their clients’ primary
interest at the start of a lawsuit is to recover money, and
that that goal remains constant throughout the course of the
litigation.9 By contrast, the lawyers interviewed for this
study frequently described their clients’ collective justice
goals, including showing that the defendant was wrong,
ensuring that others did not experience the same problems
in the future, and wanting to see “justice done.”10 Indeed,
many of the lawyers actively encouraged their clients to
develop and maintain these goals throughout the lawsuit in

6. See supra note 2.
7. See Garth, Power and Legal Artifice, supra note 2, at 239, 242-43, 259.
8. Barclay & Marshall, supra note 1, at 196; Corey Shdaimah, Dilemmas of “Progressive”
Lawyering: Empowerment and Hierarchy, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE, supra note 1,
at 239, 241.
9. See generally, Relis, It's Not About the Money!, supra note 4; RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN
LITIGATION AND MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 33-61; SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND
GETTING EVEN (1990).
10. See infra notes 101 & 122 and accompanying text.
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order to prevent them from being tempted by individual
settlement offers that fail to compensate the rest of the
class. The only collective justice goal about which the
lawyers were less aware was the desire to change corporate
conduct throughout the relevant industry.
These results highlight the unique lawyer-client dynamic in class
actions. They also demonstrate that while class action lawyers
consciously shape their clients’ expectations, named plaintiffs—unlike
individual plaintiffs—are usually willing participants in that shaping
process. Most embrace it, because it encourages the collective justice
expectations and extra-legal goals that other disputing processes repress.
The findings from this article are relevant to several different
audiences described below.
A.

Scholars

This article will enhance several areas of legal scholarship,
including class actions, dispute resolution, cause lawyering, and the legal
profession. Much of the literature in these areas assumes the
motivations of class action participants, often based on economic and
other predictive models. This study provides empirical data that both
support and contradict many of these assumptions, and thus will sharpen
the scholarly debate and recommendations for reforms that emanate
from it.
In addition, this study examines the relationship between class
action lawyers and named plaintiffs from the perspective of the
participants themselves, rather than through a more detached analysis of
class action statutes, rules, procedures, pleadings and results. And
similarly, it provides space for named plaintiffs to articulate their
expectations of, and reactions to, the class action process. As such, it
provides empirical data to both support and challenge assumptions about
class action participants.
B.

Lawyers, Law Students, and the Professors Who Teach Them

This article includes important lessons for practicing lawyers and
students preparing to enter the profession, regardless of whether they
ever litigate class actions. For example, by reinforcing and expanding
on earlier studies concerning the non-monetary motivations of
individuals who utilize various dispute-resolution systems, this article
underscores the need for lawyers and law students to ascertain their
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clients’ goals and remain cognizant of them (and how they might be
changing) throughout the course of the representation. For while it is
standard practice for students in law school clinics and lawyering skills
courses (and presumably among practicing lawyers) to inquire about
their client’s goals at the start of the representation, lawyers too often
fail to check in with their clients during the course of the litigation to
ascertain if those goals have changed.11 Such regular checking-in will
make lawyers better able to monitor their clients’ expectations
throughout the course of the class action, and to respond to client
concerns about whether those expectations are likely to be met.
For plaintiffs’ attorneys, regardless of whether they represent
individuals or groups of plaintiffs, this article reinforces the empirical
observation that plaintiffs enter disputes with an overlapping variety of
goals and expectations. And while this article cannot claim a cause and
effect relationship between lawyer awareness of those various goals and
client satisfaction with lawyers, it is certainly true that (1) most of the
lawyers in this study knew about their clients’ diverse motivations, and
(2) most of the named plaintiffs had a positive impression of their
lawyers. This study also demonstrates that the named plaintiffs’
evaluation of the fairness of the litigation process often depends on the
skill and effectiveness of their attorney who, after all, is the main (and
often sole) link between the named plaintiff(s) and that process. For
defendants’ attorneys, this study supports the view that “slavish
adherence to the . . . [idea] of zealous advocacy” may not be in a
lawyer’s self-interest, nor that of her client.12 Indeed, as several
interviewees (both lawyers and named plaintiffs) indicated, overzealous
defense lawyers at the deposition table or other points in the litigation
may only make it more difficult for a case to be settled.
Moreover, while this study demonstrates that some named plaintiffs
equate a successful case and process fairness with financial
compensation (the working assumption of many lawyers, according to
past research on individual cases13), it also underscores that many named
plaintiffs have a broader view of success and fairness, measuring them in
terms of achieving social changes that extend beyond the defendant in
their particular case.

11. See generally DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (2d ed. 2004).
12. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation:
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
473, 495 (2008) [hereinafter Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, Procedural Justice].
13. See Relis, It's Not About the Money!, supra note 4.
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Finally, the study reminds lawyers, law students, and their
professors that lawyers exert considerable power over their clients and
the framing of disputes that they present. This power can be exercised
both by commission (e.g., informing the client of legal claims and
remedies about which they were previously ignorant) and omission (e.g.,
failing to seek remedies the client desires but cannot obtain through the
legal system). This power may be especially pronounced in the class
action context, given (1) the broad scope of relief typically sought, (2)
the named plaintiffs’ initial ignorance of such potential relief, and (3) the
named plaintiffs’ relative lack of control over the process. The irony
suggested by the data in this study is that while class action lawyers
frequently create and must sustain the named plaintiff’s desire for broad
relief (i.e., beyond personal monetary compensation) in order for the
case to continue (and the lawyer to earn a fee), many lawyers are
unaware that those desires sometimes develop a life of their own,
frequently extending beyond the contours of the legal system.
Moreover, achieving these “extra-legal” goals is a major determinant of
the named plaintiff’s satisfaction with the case result. As such, it
behooves lawyers to remain cognizant of those goals and discuss them
with their client as the case progresses. In addition to the goodwill that
typically flows from effective communication between lawyer and
client, communicating about these extra-legal goals may help both
lawyer and client devise alternate means of achieving them (e.g., via
publicity about the lawsuit that, in and of itself, might deter others in a
particular industry from engaging in the same conduct as the defendant).
Such communication has multiple benefits, for, as Shestowsky and Brett
note, “[L]awyer-client counseling protocols that take into account
disputants’ preferences can promote the democratic functioning of
dispute resolution mechanisms and increase citizens’ respect for the
legal system as a means for effectively and respectfully reducing legal
conflict.”14 The interviews conducted for this article endorse the view
that clients whose goals are taken into account came away with a
positive attitude toward the dispute resolution process.
C.

Policy Makers

This study’s findings suggest at least one reform to improve the
class action process: creating a standardized formula for compensating
14. Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ Perceptions of Dispute Resolution
Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63, 72
(2008).
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named plaintiffs for the time and money they spend fulfilling that role.
Most named plaintiffs spend considerable time preparing for, and
enduring, a deposition that frequently contains questions completely
unrelated to the claims in the lawsuit. Currently, incentive awards are
provided on an ad hoc basis, usually ranging between $1000 and $1500
in consumer credit class actions.15 Calculating those awards according
to a standardized formula, such as a percentage of the total payout to
class members, would provide the named plaintiff with a better idea of
what to expect should she be successful.
This article begins with a brief description of class actions and
some of the controversy surrounding them. It then provides a
description of its empirical methodology and continues with a
description of the theoretical frame within which the empirical data is
later analyzed. The bulk of the article is devoted to an analysis of the
data on a number of fronts, including the goals of lawyers and named
plaintiffs, their degree of satisfaction with the result of the lawsuit, and
their evaluation of the fairness of the process.
II. BACKGROUND CONTEXT: CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Class actions stir passions like few procedural devices in American
law. Supporters assert that they are the best means available to stop
widespread corporate abuse in an age of governmental deregulation, and
to vindicate or expand the rights of large groups of innocent and often
lower income individuals, many of whom would otherwise be
financially unable to assert their relatively modest claims in court.16
Others have noted that, regardless of the outcome on the merits of a
particular case, class actions can mobilize individuals and social
movements in order to increase political support for a particular cause.17
Critics decry the way they have been used to extort exorbitant
settlements from innocent businesses and sublimate the interests of class
15. Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs:
An Empirical Study 27 (New York University Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper No. 40,
2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=nyu_lewp.
16. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS 3-4 (7th ed. 2010);
HERBERT B. NEWBERG ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5:7, § 5:19, § 5:21 (2009); See also
Garth, Power and Legal Artifice, supra note 2; John C. Coffee Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).
17. See Lynn Mather, Conclusion: The Mobilizing Potential of Class Actions, 57 IND. L. J.
(1981-1982) (discussing the role court cases have played in social movements); MICHAEL
MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION
79 (1994).
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members to those of greedy plaintiffs’ lawyers who are only interested
in obtaining hefty attorney’s fee awards, sometimes by settling early.18
Other critics maintain that class actions frequently fail to solve the
targeted problems, while alienating the plaintiffs and limiting social
change opportunities by diverting energy and resources from more
effective and client-centered advocacy efforts.19 Still others observe that
since the 1970’s the class action has been transformed from a sword for
justice to a shield for defendants, permitting them to cap liability and
appear as responsible corporate actors.20
U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts recently noted that
class actions are “a dramatic departure from the normal rules of
litigation,” and intimated that their main purpose is to provide leverage
to the plaintiff in settlement negotiations.21 Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Richard Posner has noted that the certification of a class
of plaintiffs can force “defendants to stake their companies on the
outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of
bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability.”22 And in an
attitude reflected in the responses of many of the plaintiffs’ lawyers
included in this study, one defense attorney has explained that the
problem with class actions is not in the process itself, but with the judges
who administer them:
A class action lawsuit is much like a game of Russian roulette. It
depends almost entirely on the philosophy of the judge trying the
lawsuit. If he thinks class action suits serve a useful social purpose,
then he will find grounds for continuing the action. If, on the other
hand, he thinks the particular case deals with a nit-picking problem of
no social consequence, and if he joins that with a view that class action
lawsuits unnecessarily clog court calendars, then he will probably
dismiss the action.23

18. Walter Dellinger, The Class Action Fairness Act: Curbing Unfairness and Restoring
Faith in our Judicial System, Progressive Policy Institute Policy Report 3-4 (2003); HENSLER,
CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 1, at 4.
19. See generally, GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2008) (arguing that using
the courts as a means to bring social change has not been very effective); Derrick Bell, Serving Two
Masters: Integration Ideals and Clients Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L. J.
470 (1976); William Simon, Visions of Practice In Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 481
(1984).
20. Natalie C. Scott, Don’t Forget Me! The Client in a Class Action Lawsuit, 15 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 561, 565 (2002).
21. Adam Liptak, Appellate Argument: An Artist’s View, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/us/22bar.html.
22. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.).
23. HENSLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 1, at 16.
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These critiques are top-down observations of the class action
process as a social phenomenon that, depending on the perspective of the
observer, is either an inspired, misguided, or counterproductive vehicle
for social change. One assumes that this debate will continue to rage,
leading to ever more tinkering with the procedures that govern class
actions. But what do we know of how the participants view this
procedural device and what role should those views have in the debate
going forward? Moreover, what can those views teach us about the
complementary and contradictory ways in which class action lawyers
and their clients view not only the class action mechanism but the legal
system generally? And finally, how might lawyers use their awareness
of named plaintiffs’ attitudes to become more effective and ethical
advocates? This article seeks to answer these questions.
III. RESEARCH METHOD
As noted above, the purpose of this study is to examine the
motivations and expectations that plaintiffs’ lawyers and named
plaintiffs bring to their involvement in consumer class action lawsuits. It
also seeks to shed light on how the parties to class action suits manage
their motivations and expectations through the course of often protracted
cases. The research takes a qualitative approach, i.e., it seeks to
understand the motivations and expectations of lawyers and clients in
class action suits from their own points of view, and in their full
complexity rather than in their distributional frequency. The methods
were therefore inductive and consisted of semi-structured interviews
with open-ended questions that focus on a set of key themes: why the
interviewee became involved in the class action suit, whether initial
motivations for becoming involved remained constant or changed during
the course of the suit, the interviewee’s level of satisfaction with the
result of the case, and the interviewee’s evaluation of the fairness of the
litigation process.
The interview questions for attorneys and
representative plaintiffs are attached as Appendix A and Appendix B,
respectively.
This methodology serves the objective of the research to capture
the particularities of different cases and to identify the key themes they
share. Because the study examines the key motivations and expectations
that lawyers and clients bring to class action suits, the interview of
thirty-three lawyers and twenty named plaintiffs is sufficient to reach
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thematic saturation: the point at which no new themes emerge.24 The
interviews for this study took place between April 2008 and December
2009.25 Interviews were conducted by me, as well as staff and students
at the University of Minnesota Center for Survey Research, the
University of Wisconsin Survey Center, the University of Minnesota
Law School, and the University of Wisconsin Law School. Interviews
were conducted either in person or via telephone. All interviews were
audio taped.26 Interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality as to all
potentially identifying information, including the names of parties,
attorneys, cases, judges, and courts.
The lawyers interviewed for the study specialize in litigating
consumer class actions. Most were selected from the publicly available
membership listing of the National Association of Consumer Advocates,
a nationwide membership and advocacy organization of over 1500
attorneys27. NACA’s website states that “[a]s an organization fully
committed to promoting justice for consumers, NACA's members and
their clients are actively engaged in promoting a fair and open
marketplace that forcefully protects the rights of consumers, particularly
those of modest means.”28 The lawyers interviewed work in a total of
seventeen states, from every major region of the country, with no more
than four attorneys from any one state. Prior to each of these interviews,
the lawyers were asked to identify a closed (no longer pending) class
action lawsuit which they had litigated that would be the subject of most
of the questions during the course of the interview. They were also
asked to provide contact information for one or more of the named
plaintiffs from that particular lawsuit. In many cases, the lawyer made
the initial contact with the client in order to determine whether the client

24. Greg Guest et al., How Many Interviews Are Enough?: An Experiment with Data
Saturation and Variability, 18 FIELD METHODS 59, 64-65 (2006); Michael W. Firmin, Themes, in
THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 868 (Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al. eds.,
2004). Because the goal of this research was to describe shared perceptions among two relatively
homogenous groups (i.e., named plaintiffs in consumer class actions and their lawyers), this sample
size was sufficient to achieve thematic saturation. See Guest et al., supra, at 76 (“If the goal is to
describe a shared perception, belief, or behavior among a relatively homogeneous group, then a
sample of twelve will likely be sufficient.”).
25. Seven interviews of lawyers, which were part of a pilot study, were conducted in the
spring of 2008. The pilot study consisted of email surveys followed by telephone interviews.
26. Interview tapes are on file with the author.
27. National Association of Consumer Advocates, http://www.naca.net/. (Last visited Mar.
14, 2010).
28. Id.
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would be willing to participate in an interview about the class action.29
This contact usually facilitated client willingness to participate in the
study.
I focused on consumer class actions for a number of reasons. First,
consumer law cases are a discrete, but not insignificant category of class
action litigation in the United States. In 2006 and 2007, the most recent
years for which data is available, consumer law cases (which include
misrepresentation, fraud, failure to make required disclosures, and
abusive debt collection practices) comprised 19% and 18%, respectively,
of all federal court class action settlements across the country.30 The
only category of cases with a larger percentage of settlements during
those years was securities law, at 40% and 35%, respectively.31 Second,
consumer class actions almost always involve individual named
plaintiffs, as opposed to securities class actions, where the named
plaintiff is often a financial institution.32 Third, the individual named
plaintiffs in consumer class actions typically have direct knowledge of,
and interest in, the subject matter of the lawsuit, which may not be the
case in other, more complicated class actions involving issues such as
securities and antitrust law. And finally, because consumer class actions
frequently seek both monetary and injunctive relief, they hold the
potential for conflict between attorneys and clients over motivations for
filing and continuing to litigate the lawsuit.33
At first glance, this study’s empirical focus on consumer class
actions suggests that its conclusions are limited to the consumer law
context. For example, less money is typically at stake in consumer class
actions than in other types of class actions, particularly securities class
actions.34 Moreover, the named plaintiffs in consumer class actions have
29. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 30044 (Dec. 1, 2009); Telephone Interview 30034 (Sept.
25, 2009).
30. Brian Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards,
107 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2010), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442108, at 10. (CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies Paper; Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 10-10; Vanderbilt Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 10-06.) In his Study, Fitzpatrick provides data for class actions under two
separate categories of “consumer” (in which he includes cases brought under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act and consumer fraud) and “debt collection” (cases brought under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act). I have combined his statistical findings under the general rubric of
consumer law cases for purposes of their relevance to this article.
31. Id.
32. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1616 (2006).
33. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 15.
34. In 2006 and 2007, the last years for which data has been compiled, the total ascertainable
value in securities class actions was over $16.7 billion and $8 billion, respectively (the disparity
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typically suffered relatively modest (if any) financial harm, as opposed
to the named plaintiffs in employment, antitrust, or securities litigation.35
And consumer class actions often seek relief that benefits society
generally (e.g., injunctions barring similar conduct in the future),
whereas other class actions seek only monetary recovery.36 While these
contextual differences suggest that research on named plaintiffs in other
types of class actions is warranted, many of this study’s conclusions
apply to class actions generally.
A few particulars about the lawsuits selected by the attorneys
interviewed for this study: approximately one half of the cases involved
some form of misrepresentation, fraud, or breach of contract against
mortgage companies, insurance companies, landlords and various
product manufacturers. The other half involved abusive debt collection
practices, credit reporting errors, or discriminatory credit terms. The
class sizes ranged from less than 100 class members (a landlord/tenant
case) to tens of millions (a product labeling case), with about one third
of the cases under 1500. The duration of the cases ranged from one year
to ten years, with the bulk between two and six years.
The methodology for this study is not without risk of bias. First, by
allowing the lawyers to choose the case on which they wanted to focus
in an interview, one would expect the only cases so selected to have
been successful in the eyes of the attorneys and, perhaps, their clients.
Most lawyers avoid telling “war stories” about unsuccessful cases. This
proved to be true for most, but not quite all, of the lawyers interviewed:
two lawyers opted to discuss proposed class actions that were never
certified.37 This tendency to choose “successful” cases might be seen as
biasing perceptions of fairness, given the suggestion in the distributive
justice literature that outcomes are a major determinant of disputants’
views of the fairness of an adjudicative process.38
However, by permitting attorneys to choose the case to be
discussed, this study is actually better able to isolate and analyze
perceptions of fairness. Insofar as one would expect attorneys and
clients to equate success (usually identified in terms of resource
allocation) with procedural fairness, to the extent that interviewees

between those two years is largely attributable to the settlement of litigation over the collapse of
Enron). For those same years, the values in federal court consumer class actions was over $525
million and $735 million, respectively. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 18.
35. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 16, at 19.
36. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 15.
37. Telephone Interview 2002 (Apr. 3, 2009); Telephone Interview 30013 (Oct. 25, 2008).
38. Shestowsky& Brett, supra note 14, at 90-91.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 3

8_MEILI_WESTERN.DOC

82

2/11/20119:52 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:67

criticize the fairness of their class action, we will learn more about the
ingredients of disputants’ perceptions of fairness of process. And, sure
enough, several interviewees have criticized the fairness of an outwardly
“successful” class action, usually because it took too long, lacked an incourt hearing, put the named plaintiff through an unnecessarily grueling
and demeaning deposition, or featured a judge who did not understand
class action procedure.
Second, it is far easier to arrange interviews with lawyers than with
named plaintiffs. Given my requirement that a case selected for the
study must be closed, many of the lawyers had not been in touch with
their clients for a significant period of time. Some of those clients have
either moved or were otherwise unable or unwilling to be interviewed.
As such, the study did not include a corresponding named plaintiff for
each of the lawyers interviewed. Although this prevented a direct
comparison between lawyer and client in each case, it nevertheless
allowed for an examination of the range of viewpoints of plaintiffs’
attorneys and representative plaintiffs toward the class action
mechanism.
Third, while in individual cases the client chooses her lawyer, in
many class actions the opposite is generally true, at least in situations
where the lawyer has more than one potential named plaintiff from
which to choose before filing suit.39 As is evident from the interviews
reviewed below, this means that many class action lawyers select as
class representatives those plaintiffs whose goals toward the case reflect
their own (or are willing to have their goals expanded to mirror the
collective justice goals of their lawyer), and therefore go beyond mere
financial reward. As such, one might expect the field of named plaintiffs
in this study to harbor attitudes dissimilar to individual plaintiffs, and
more like the lawyers who select them. This, however, was not the case.
The main difference between the named plaintiffs in this study and
individual plaintiffs analyzed in various studies over the years is that the
named plaintiffs here were encouraged by their attorneys to maintain and
even expand their non-monetary, collective justice goals throughout the
course of the lawsuit. Individual plaintiffs learn to suppress such extralegal goals because their lawyers have told them that they are
unattainable.40

39. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 171 (1997).
40. See Relis, It’s not about the Money!, supra note 4, at 702.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss1/3

16

Meili: Collective Justice or Personal Gain?

8_MEILI_WESTERN.DOC

2011]

2/11/20119:52 AM

COLLECTIVE JUSTICE OR PERSONAL GAIN?

83

IV. THEORETICAL FRAME: DISPUTE TRANSFORMATION AND
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
The two components of the theoretical frame for this article are
well known. The extensive literature on dispute transformation
catalogues the various contexts within which lawyers shape their
individual clients’ expectations and goals to what is realistically
attainable within the legal system.41 Indeed, this process involves not
simply how lawyers frame a dispute for their clients, but which of the
ever-expanding range of dispute-resolution mechanisms (e.g., litigation,
mediation, arbitration, negotiation) they invoke.42
In a recent study of litigants in medical malpractice cases, Tamara
Relis described dispute transformation as a two-step process:
First, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ dispute descriptions and initial
expressed desires, lawyers condition clients on “legal system realities”
and persuade them to aim for what they view as legally realistic.
Attorneys then reframe litigants’ dispute experiences, feelings and
extra-legal aims to fit into legally cognizable compartments suitable
for processing within the legal system.43

Thus, while aggrieved clients often present themselves to lawyers
with extra-legal, non-monetary goals that generally fall within the rubric
of “justice being done” (e.g., the desire for an apology, an
acknowledgement of wrongdoing from the defendant, or an assurance
that the same harm will not befall others), their lawyers convert such
aims into the kind of relief that the legal system can provide: money.
This transformation process equates “doing justice” with recovering
money from the defendant.44 Stewart Macaulay made a similar finding
in his seminal study of individual consumer protection lawsuits,
observing that the plaintiffs in such disputes will receive only the
remedy (i.e., statutory damages) that the lawyers deems available and
appropriate.45 This conversion process leads to disappointment with the
legal system among many individual clients, given that their “extra41. See Felstiner et al., supra note 3, at 648; SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 3; WHITE,
JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 3.
42. Jeffrey H. Goldfien & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What if the Lawyers Have Their Way? An
Empirical Assessment of Conflict Strategies and Attitudes toward Mediation Styles, 22 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL.277 (2007) (discussing different mediation styles and how lawyers select mediators
for their clients).
43. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 704-05.
44. Id. at 702.
45. Stuart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & SOC. REV 115, 156
(1979).
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legal” goals remain constant, and thus unfulfilled, throughout the course
of a lawsuit.46 In his study of different types of class actions, Garth
notes, “Dispute transformation in class actions, it seems, narrows the
problem dramatically to get it before the court, and then the resulting
settlements do not even provide much in the way of legal remedies.”47
Despite this transforming process, Garth observes that in many contexts,
particularly when the representative plaintiffs are actively involved
throughout the litigation, the class action “at least permits significant
empowering both of individuals and of the lawyers and the classes they
represent.”48 As noted later in this article, most of the named plaintiffs
in this study exhibited a sense of empowerment regardless of their level
of involvement with the litigation. This suggests that even if the class
action lawyers in this study narrowed the plaintiffs’ problem to enable it
to be filed in court, the broad scope of remedies achieved through
settlement—and the many individuals to whom that relief applies—
prevented the kind of alienation and frustration that such a
transformation process frequently instills within individual plaintiffs.49
Procedural justice theory posits that disputants generally privilege
the fairness of a given adjudicative procedure over monetary results.50 It
contrasts with the theory of distributive justice, according to which
participants assess the fairness of an adjudicative procedure by the
distribution of rights or resources flowing from it.51 The work of John
Thibault and Laurens Walker demonstrates that procedures matter
profoundly to most participants because they believe that fair procedures
produce fair outcomes.52 In a recent study of participants in a mediation
setting, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff and Tom Tyler found “no
relationship between the experienced fairness of the negotiation process
and the numerical outcome” of the dispute.53 In other words,
participants in adjudicative processes view the fairness of the process
employed to resolve their dispute as “separate and apart from their
interest in achieving a favorable outcome.”54 Similarly, Donna
Shestowsky has observed that “perceptions of how fair a procedure is

46.
720-22.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See FELSTINER & SARAT, supra note 3; Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at
See Garth, Power and Legal Artifice, supra note 2, at 259.
Id. at 267 (emphasis in original).
Felstiner et al, supra note 3, at 648.
Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 14, at 68.
Id.
Thibault & Walker, supra note 5, at 1285-86.
Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 12, at 490.
Id. at 477.
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tend to depend as much, if not more, on process characteristics than on
whether particular disputants ‘won’ their case or were otherwise favored
by the outcome.”55
The procedural justice literature has also provided valuable insight
into why plaintiffs decide to sue. For example, we know that plaintiffs
often sue because of what they perceive as unfair or impersonal
treatment.56 They “care . . . about having neutral, honest authorities who
allow [them] to state their views and who treat them with dignity and
respect, and when they find such processes, they use and defer to
them.”57 They also “want to deal with people whose motives they
trust.”58 The core tenets of the procedural justice theory are applicable
in a variety of individual case areas, including employment law, workers
compensation, medical malpractice, torts, and prison sentencing.59 And
they appear to hold true for all individual plaintiffs, regardless of their
income, race, or gender.60

55. Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution
Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
549, 574 (2008). See also Adam Lamarello, Incorporating the Procedural Justice Model into
Federal Sentencing Jurisprudence in the Aftermath of United States v. Booker: Establishing United
States Sentencing Courts, 4 NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 112 (2009).
56. See Robert J. Bies & Tom Tyler, The ‘Litigation Mentality’ in Organizations: A Test of
Alternative Psychological Explanations, 4 ORG. SCI. 352 (1993); E. Allen Lind et al., The Winding
Road from Employee to Complainant: Situational and Psychological Determinants of Wrongful
Termination Claims, 45ADMIN. SCI. Q. 557 (2000); Gerald Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted
Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359
(1992); C. Vincent et al., Why do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking
Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609 (1994); Howard Beckman et al., The Doctor-Patient Relationship
and Malpractice. Lessons from Plaintiff Depositions, 154 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1365 (1994).
57. Susan Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 323, 337 (2005);
See also Tom Tyler & Edgar Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Mark Zanna ed., 1992); Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice,
Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH
(Michael Tonry ed., 2003).
58. Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 12, at 492.
59. See Bies & Tyler, supra note 56; Lind et al., supra note 56; See also Karen Roberts &
Karen Markel, Claiming in the Name of Fairness: Organizational Justice and the Decision to File
for Workplace Injury Compensation, 6 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 332 (2001); Hickson
et al., supra note 56; Vincent et al., supra note 56; Beckman, et al., supra note 56; Tom Tyler, What
is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988); Tom Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’
Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51 (1984); Jonathan D. Casper
et al. Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483 (1988); Relis, It’s Not About
the Money!, supra note 4.
60. See Tom Tyler & Robert Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, but Why? The
Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237 (1997);
Edgar Lind et al., …And Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for Dispute Resolution
Procedures, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1994); Carol Kulik et al., Understanding Gender
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A significant corollary to the procedural justice literature is the
“process control” theory developed by Thibault and Walker.61
According to this theory, disputants evaluate the fairness of a given
procedure according to the distribution of control that it offers, and
prefer those procedures that allow them (as opposed to third parties like
judges and mediators) to control the development and selection of
information that will be used to resolve the dispute.62 Thus, an
interesting question at the intersection of the process control and dispute
transformation theories is whether disputants’ perceptions of process
fairness is influenced by the degree to which their underlying dispute—
and thus the information relevant to it—is shaped by their attorney, as
opposed to a third party decision-maker. This is a particularly intriguing
question in the class action context, given that the interviews conducted
for this study suggest that most named plaintiffs (and certainly class
members) have less control over the development and selection of
information to be used in the case than their counterparts in individual
lawsuits.
In one of several studies of the Victims Compensation Fund
established after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Gillian Hadfield
observes that procedural fairness not only plays an important role in
individuals’ “willingness to cooperate as objects of governance” (i.e., as
players in state-sanctioned decision-making processes), but also in
situations where people see themselves as “agents of governance” (i.e.,
where the State provides them the opportunity to disseminate private
information into the public domain, force accountability and prompt
responsive change through litigation).63 In a similar vein, Elizabeth
Boyle notes that in “highly interpenetrated” societies that lack clear
boundaries between the state and civil society, individuals can see
themselves as “hav[ing] an obligation to act as agents for other
individuals and for society” generally.64 Indeed, Congress and many
state legislatures promote the idea of agents of governance through fee-

Differences in Distributive and Procedural Justice, 9 SOC. JUST. RESEARCH 351 (1996); Tom Tyler
& Yuen Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND
COURTS (2002).
61. Thibault & Walker, supra note 5, at 1286.
62. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 14, at 69.
63. Gillian Hadfield, Framing the Choice between Cash and Courthouse: Experiences with
the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645, 674 (2008) (emphasis in original).
64. Elizabeth Boyle, Is Law the Rule? Using Political Frames to Explain Cross-National
Variation in Legal Activity, 79 SOC. FORCES 385, 1200 (2000); see also Elizabeth Boyle, Political
Frames and Legal Activity: The Case of Nuclear Power in Four Countries, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
141 (1998).
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shifting statues which create so-called “private attorney[s] general” to
enforce consumer protection laws.65 Most of the named plaintiffs in this
study embraced this role, seeing themselves protecting the public (or at
least a portion of it) in addition to their individual interests. Such causeoriented motivation is critical in class actions, given that the amount of
individual recovery is typically insufficient to adequately compensate
named plaintiffs for the time and energy required of that role.
Relis’ recent study of medical malpractice cases reveals that many
plaintiffs’ lawyers are unaware of these well-documented client motives.
She has concluded, based on interviews with the various players in such
cases that, among other things, “most plaintiffs’ lawyers felt that money
was plaintiffs’ primary litigation aim.”66 Those lawyers either were
ignorant of, or discounted, their clients’ non-pecuniary goals, including
obtaining answers about what happened, acknowledgements of harm,
apologies, defendants’ acceptance of responsibility, and retribution for
insulting physician conduct.67 Relis also found that despite lawyers’ best
efforts to condition their clients to accept only what the legal system has
to offer (i.e., monetary compensation), clients retain their extra-legal
objectives throughout the course of a dispute.68 The lawyers most likely
remained ignorant of this consistently-held viewpoint because their
clients stopped articulating their goals to them, and because their
lawyers conditioned them into believing they were not attainable.69
As the above review illustrates, the literature on dispute
transformation and procedural justice provides extensive analysis of the
behavior and attitudes of lawyers and litigants in individual cases. Far
less attention, however, has been paid to such behavior and attitudes in
the class action context. And as noted earlier in this article, research in
the class action context would be of interest, and use, to a variety of
audiences. For while there have been recent attempts to blunt the impact
and some of the alleged abuses of class actions, most notably through
passage of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), there is no sign that
class action filings are diminishing. Indeed, the recent ALI study
referenced above found that much of the 46% increase in federal court
class action activity between 2001 and 2006 was in federal question
65. Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an
Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1988). See also James D.
Jeffries, Protection for Consumers Against Unfair and Deceptive Business, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 559
(1974) (examining the statutes enacted in Wisconsin that promote consumer protection).
66. Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 718.
67. Id. at 702.
68. Id. at 735, 739.
69. Id. at 735, 741-42.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 3

8_MEILI_WESTERN.DOC

88

2/11/20119:52 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:67

cases, and thus not attributable to the Class Action Fairness Act’s
diversion of diversity actions from state to federal court.70 Moreover,
many enterprising class action lawyers have responded to CAFA by
seeking out the most plaintiff-friendly federal courts, thus replicating on
the federal level one of the practices CAFA was intended to deter in
state courts.71 Indeed, one of the lawyers interviewed for this study
stated that “I think CAFA was seen as something that would not be good
for class actions at first. But I think now it’s turning out that it’s not as
bad as everybody first thought.”72 And only one of the lawyers
interviewed listed CAFA (or any of its provisions) as something they
would change about the class action process.73 Therefore, it is important
from both a scholarly and public policy perspective to determine if what
the literature tells us about lawyers and clients in individual cases also
holds true in class actions. We now turn to the data that will help answer
this question.
V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
This section of the article is divided into the three general areas of
inquiry that the open-ended interview questions explored: goals,
satisfaction with result, and evaluation of fairness. Each such section
analyzes the views of both the named plaintiffs and the attorneys, as well
as the attorneys’ perceptions of their clients’ attitudes on each question.
A.

Comparative Analysis of Named Plaintiffs’ Goals
1. Named Plaintiffs’ Goals

The named plaintiffs’ responses to an open-ended question about
why they had initiated their class action reveal a series of complex and
overlapping sets of goals. Most named plaintiffs cited more than two
goals.74 Their responses fell into two broad categories that I have termed
self-interest (personal recovery of money or other benefit, which was
mentioned by thirteen of twenty named plaintiffs) and collective justice

70. Thomas Willging et al., The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 on the
Federal Court, The American Law Institute 3 (2008).
71. Terry Carter, A Step up in Class, 22 A.B.A. J. 24 (2008).
72. Interview 30014, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 25, 2008).
73. Telephone Interview 30047 (Oct. 29, 2009) (One of the questions posed to lawyers was
“If you could change the class action procedure in any way, what, if anything would you change?”).
74. The average number of goals was 2.3, while the median and mode were each 2. One
named plaintiff articulated six different goals. Telephone Interview 1018 (Dec. 12, 2008).
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(goals that would benefit the class as a whole, and perhaps society
generally, which was mentioned by seventeen named plaintiffs). The
self-interest goals included receiving a personal refund, a repaired
product, or some other form of specific performance directed only to the
named plaintiff, as opposed to the entire class. Only three of the thirteen
named plaintiffs who articulated a self-interest goal listed that goal as
their sole motivation for filing the class action. Their responses were as
follows:
I just wanted my car fixed.75
My goal was to get full insurance coverage.76
The [device I had to install on my own] cost $100 to install. I just
wanted to get the $100 back.77

These three named plaintiffs said nothing about helping others or
society generally or making an example of the defendant. They only
wanted their money back, their claims paid, or a new vehicle. However,
they were atypical among the named plaintiffs in this study. The other
ten named plaintiffs who mentioned self-interest goals also articulated
one or more collective justice goals. Thus, most named plaintiffs in this
study sought some form of justice for themselves as well as for the other
members of the class.
The named plaintiffs articulated several collective justice goals.
The most common was a desire to help others affected by the
defendant’s conduct, which was mentioned by half of the named
plaintiffs.78 The following response is typical:
My goal was to represent a class of people who probably didn’t lose
that much money, but were wronged.79

Some named plaintiffs were particularly concerned about other
class members who were vulnerable because of age or ethnicity. For
example, one named plaintiff said she was motivated to serve as a class
75. Telephone Interview 30037 (Nov. 4, 2009) (class action against automobile manufacturer
to repair a design defect involving the gas tank).
76. Telephone Interview 30039 (Nov. 24, 2009) (class action against insurance company for
breach of contract over failure to pay property damage claim for damaged vehicle).
77. Telephone Interview 30036 (Nov. 3, 2009) (class action against appliance manufacturer
for misrepresentation).
78. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 30038 (Nov. 30, 2009); Interview 30034, supra note 29;
Telephone Interview 30028, (Apr. 21, 2009); Telephone Interview 30033 (July 24, 2009);
Telephone Interview 30030 (Apr. 1, 2009).
79. Interview 30038, supra note 78 (class action against bank for excessive mortgage closing
fees).
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representative in a class action challenging a standard form debt
collection letter because many recipients would not be able to
understand the contents of the letter:
I think I was angry at the time . . . it seemed like it [serving as a named
plaintiff] was basically something that could help not just me but
everyone else that was involved that maybe didn’t understand a few
things because you have different people that come from different
backgrounds, you know, the languages or cultures or what have you
and maybe some really didn’t understand some of those things . . .
until you have to sit and read and read and read.80

The motivation to help others is an example of named plaintiffs
assuming the role of agents of governance, seeing the class action as a
means to call private entities to account in the way that an attorney
general or other public official might.81 For these named plaintiffs, the
class action is a vehicle for achieving justice for a large number of
people affected by the same harm. It is also the means by which a
“wrong” can be set right. This theme of righting wrongs appears
consistently in the comments of the named plaintiffs, suggesting that
they view the class action as one of the only areas where “little people”
can take on large corporate interests.
In a similar vein, four named plaintiffs said that they were
motivated by a desire to stop the activity giving rise to the lawsuit in the
first place.82 The following statement from the named plaintiff in a class
action against a credit card company for debt collection practices is
illustrative:
My goals were to stop the company from doing that to people.83

Another collective justice motivation was the desire to make a
public statement about the defendant’s conduct, which was mentioned
by seven named plaintiffs.84 The public statements envisioned by these
named plaintiffs had two purposes. The first was a public accounting;
i.e., a statement that the defendant’s conduct was, quite simply, wrong.

80. Interview 30034, supra note 29.
81. See Hadfield, supra note 63, at 674.
82. Interview 1018, supra note 74; Interview 30028, supra note 78; Telephone Interview
30029 (May 5, 2009); Telephone Interview 30035 (Oct. 20, 2009).
83. Interview 30028, supra note 78 (class action against credit card company for abusive debt
collection practices)
84. Telephone Interview 1017 (Dec. 3, 2008); Interview 30029, supra note 82; Interview
30030, supra note 78; Interview 30033, supra note 78; Interview 30034, supra note 29; Interview
30035, supra note 82; Telephone Interview 30043 (Sept. 30, 2009).
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As one named plaintiff in a class action against a company offering tax
refund anticipation loans put it:
I was pretty upset because at that point my kids were little—I’m a
single parent—and that money was really needed for bills. And I was
really upset with that. I didn’t think it was fair that they could take
money and pay a debt. And I felt if you are going to pay my debt, my
rent was due at that point, ‘pay that for me!’ And I was left with like
nothing. And I just wanted to make a stand saying you can’t do that.
You can’t take people’s money like that.85

Another named plaintiff, this one in a lawsuit challenging a debt
collector’s standard form dunning letter, cited a similar motivation:
My main goal [was] to prove that you can’t mistreat people and
basically think that you can get away with it.86

For these named plaintiffs, the class action provided an opportunity
to publicly air private grievances in a way that most individual lawsuits
do not allow. Their underlying assumption seems to be that that public
airing will force the defendant to change its conduct, either through
judicial intervention or public shaming. As such, they exhibit faith in
the legal system’s ability to bring about change, at least as it relates to
the defendant’s conduct.
The second purpose of these public statements of wrongdoing
envisioned by named plaintiffs was to serve notice on other companies
within the defendant’s industry. For these named plaintiffs, the class
action would compel these companies to change their behavior, as well.
As one named plaintiff in a class action alleging misrepresentation in
insurance rates stated:
[My goals were to] punish the defendant involved in this kind of fraud
and serve notice to other insurers that they should not engage in this
practice.87

For this and other named plaintiffs, the class action assumes a
power beyond merely forcing a particular defendant to pay money
damages to harmed class members. Indeed, it is more powerful than the
particular legal remedies available in a class action, which address only

85. Interview 30033, supra note 78 (class action against bank providing tax refund
anticipation loans).
86. Interview 30034, supra note 29.
87. Interview 1017, supra note 84 (class action against auto insurance company for
misrepresentations about rates).
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the conduct of the named defendant. For these named plaintiffs, the
class action assumes the role of public conscience or moral compass.88
The other most common collective justice motivations articulated
by named plaintiffs were anger/revenge, which was mentioned by ten
named plaintiffs,89 and obtaining information about the offending
practice, which was mentioned by four.90 I have included these
responses within the rubric of collective justice because the named
plaintiffs who articulated these goals coupled them with a desire to
benefit others in the class or society as a whole. For example, named
plaintiffs who sought truthful information about the defendant’s
practices or products wanted to use that information for the public good,
as exemplified by the named plaintiff in a class action alleging
misrepresentation by the manufacturer of an over-the-counter cold
remedy:
My goals were, first of all, that the truth be known. There were a lot of
misrepresented facts that [the defendant] was allegedly claiming were
facts. I wanted the people to know that if they wanted to continue
buying the product it’s absolutely OK with me, but I just felt it would
be a waste of people’s money, and I wanted people to know that if
there were unsatisfied people out there they [could] get their money
back, which they did, so it was actually a successful goal. So that
worked out very, very well. I understand the product is still being sold
so it isn’t completely shut down, but I wanted people to know that [the
product] didn’t work.91

88. This view of the legal system (or at least the class action mechanism) as a just arbiter
between right and wrong contrasts with the views of many legal services clients, who, according to
Corey Shdaimah, view the legal system as unjust. COREY S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE:
PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, LOW-INCOME CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL CHANGE (2009).
While this study did not obtain demographic data about the named plaintiffs, it is safe to say that
most of those who participated were within the ranks of the middle class and thus more well off
than most legal services clients. This suggests that views of the ability of the legal system to
achieve justice are in part determined by the socioeconomic status of the participant. This
discrepancy in viewpoint is also likely the result of past experiences with the legal system.
Although this study did not inquire about any such prior experience, it was apparent from the
interviews that most had none.
89. Interview 1018, supra note 74; Telephone Interview 30026 (Apr. 7, 2009), Telephone
Interview 30027 (Apr. 13, 2009); Interview 30028, supra note 78; Interview 30029, supra note 82;
Interview 30033; supra note 78; Interview 30034, supra note 29; Interview 30035, supra note 82;
Interview 30039, supra note 76; Telephone Interview 30040 (Nov. 30, 2009).
90. Interview 1018; supra note 74; Interview 30030, supra note 78; Interview 30034, supra
note 30; Telephone Interview 30042 (conducted Sept. 30, 2009).
91. Interview 30030, supra note 78 (class action against manufacturer of an over-the counter
cold remedy).
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The public good desired by information-seeking named plaintiffs
came in the form of direct financial benefit (as the quote above
indicates) or a more generalized vindication of public perceptions, as the
following statement suggests:
From the beginning we wanted to find out what happened, and
determine if it was willful negligence. I don’t know if that is a correct
phrase [laughter]. You know, whether they were just helpless boobs or
whether they actually had malintent.92

Similarly, those named plaintiffs who expressed anger towards, or a
desire for revenge against, the defendant saw the class action as a way to
channel that anger into something that would benefit others. Their anger
typically resulted from a feeling that they (and other customers) were
being disrespected. As one named plaintiff in a class action against the
producer of agricultural products explained:
A lot of it was the fact that I don’t like the way the companies were
just shoving things down our throats saying “Oh, don’t worry about it.”
Well, then we were supposed to take it in the shorts and that’s not right
. . . . It was like the company basically they thought we were a bunch
of dumb hicks who like country music and who wear flannel shirts.
That’s how they actually were dealing with us and they would actually
talk down to us. I think that motivated [my lawyer] and myself
equally.93

Another named plaintiff echoed the idea that the motivation for
filing the class action was the dismissive way that the defendant (here,
an insurance company) had treated its customers:
In my opinion, just my opinion, we’re real people here and we’re not
worth dirt. That’s what I’m saying. That’s what the insurance
companies make you look out to be. That [we’re] not worth nothing,
‘just give them this.’ That’s what they do. I’m sorry, but I have to say
that. 94

This desire to avenge perceived disrespect overcame whatever
reticence these named plaintiffs might have felt because of the small
financial recovery at stake. As the named plaintiff in a class action
against a mortgage company for misrepresentation observed:

92. Interview 1018, supra note 74 (class action against an Internet service provider for
deficient service).
93. Interview 30040; supra note 89.
94. Interview 30039, supra note 76.
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It was made clear up front [by my attorney] that it was just a small
amount of money and it wasn’t a lot but right afterwards I really had
the conviction that I got screwed by, and I wasn’t sure who, but I was
convinced. The amount wasn’t great enough to really do anything
with but the feeling, and this was several years later, was still there.
These jerks screwed me so it was kind of payback. But I knew the
money was not, I mean, we got a little bit but that wasn’t the
motivation. It was more just kind of to fight back, I guess.”95

Many named plaintiffs offered an overlapping array of goals, as
demonstrated by the following statement by a named plaintiff in a
lawsuit against a landlord. She includes elements of helping others,
stopping the offending conduct, anger, and shedding a public light on the
problem:
I had moved out of the [apartment] complex because they had raised
my rent . . . . I had a friend who read about [the lawsuit] in the paper
. . . . I had all the paperwork that pertained to me . . . so I just called the
lawyer and said “if you want this, maybe it will help your case,”
because I was so angry at the place. .. . I was really angry . . . . It was
just really egregious. So, that was my motivation, was just bring this
out into the open, let’s see what’s happening. The D.A. obviously
wasn’t going to go after these guys; they are going after some other big
landlords in the city at the moment who are doing other things like
this, but they didn’t address [the defendant]. So, this class action
seemed like a great idea.”96

Another named plaintiff, who sued an Internet service provider for
poor service, combined self interest (though she was not aware of the
possibility for financial recovery until after she had agreed to
participate), helping others who had been harmed, and revenge:
I didn’t go into it with the idea of getting any money at all, but when
the promise of money is held out to you, you don’t say no. But I went
into it to represent the people who had been harmed. But I guess
personal revenge was another aspect because of the personal agony I
suffered.97

In addition to illustrating the complex interconnectivity of named
plaintiff goals, the first of these two statements is noteworthy because
the named plaintiff initiated the idea of being a named plaintiff with the
95. Interview 30043, supra note 84.
96. Interview 30029, supra note 82 (class action against landlord for forcing lower income
tenants to leave a renovated apartment building).
97. Interview 1018, supra note 74.
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lawyer, which is the reverse of the more common pattern. In most cases
included in this study, the named plaintiffs approached the lawyer with a
problem affecting them individually, and agreed to serve as a named
plaintiff only after the lawyer informed them that others were suffering
the same harm.98 Nevertheless, although the sample size is too small to
justify a statistically accurate analysis, there was no correlation between
the manner in which the named plaintiffs became engaged with the class
action and his or her goals regarding the case. Those named plaintiffs
who only became aware of the possibility of a class action after
consulting with an attorney were just as committed to collective justice
goals as those who approached the lawyers with a class action in mind.
Indeed, as we will see later in this article, most plaintiff-side class action
attorneys prefer named plaintiffs who are unaware of the class action
possibility until the lawyer tells them about it.
Most of the named plaintiffs (fifteen out of twenty) stated that their
goals remained constant throughout the course of the lawsuit.99 And
nearly all who reported a change in goals indicated that their feelings of
collective justice grew stronger as the case progressed:
I think it crystallized and the more we learned the more we came to
realize that it was more of a sacrifice. Not a big sacrifice because we
learned stuff. We came to really see that we were fighting the good
fight. If we did get certified as a class it would mean something. It
became more important as it went on that we were doing the right
thing for hopefully a lot of people.100
The only thing that really bothered me about it and may have changed
my goals was I was wanting the board of directors and the chief
executive officers, the officers of the company, I was wanting them to
have to fork up some money. They made money. . . . I was hoping
along with me getting financial restitution that they would lose a little
something but in the end they didn’t. They had the insurance that
settled everything. . . . I was just not satisfied that they didn’t get hurt a
little bit like we had been hurt.101

Indeed, one consistent theme from the interviews is that many
named plaintiffs became angrier as the case progressed. In some cases,
as noted above, this increased anger resulted from discovery about the

98. See, e.g., Interview 30036, supra note 77; Interview 30039, supra note 76.
99. See, e.g., Interview 30038, supra note 78.
100. Interview 30043, supra note 84.
101. Telephone Interview 30032 (July 28, 2009) (class action against fiduciaries of an
employee benefit plan for breach of fiduciary duty).
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defendant’s conduct. In other cases, the named plaintiff’s anger was
stoked by the conduct of the defendant—or its attorneys—during the
litigation itself, particularly during depositions. As the named plaintiff
in the case against the Internet service provider described it:
The opposing side did this grueling deposition on me which was really
agonizing. I mean really, they were asking me about stuff I did in
elementary school and were obviously trying to dig up something in
my background and either make it so unpleasant for me that I pull out
of the case or find something that they could discredit my credibility.
It was probably one of the worst experiences of my life . . . . I think
they had two people in there but it was mainly just one guy, the
Bulldog. . . . Coming out the other side I felt fine but in the middle of
the process I was pretty upset . . . . I thought they were going to focus
on stuff to do with the case. But they were trying to find out all the
roommates I’d ever had in my life and I’ve had an interesting life. I’d
like to find out about all his roommates.102

The named plaintiffs’ descriptions of their goals, and the extent to
which those goals endured or intensified through the lawsuit is
consistent with the extensive literature on motivations for initiating
lawsuits and other types of formal disputes. For example, as noted
earlier, many disputants sue because they perceive that they have been
treated unfairly and/or impersonally.103 Indeed, one lasting impression
from the interviews of named plaintiffs in this study is that corporations
could save themselves hundreds of millions of dollars in damages and
attorneys’ fees if they simply altered the tone of their dealings with their
customers before conflicts intensify. Moreover, many named plaintiffs
embrace the opportunity to act as “agents of governance,” compelling
accountability by offending companies and forcing them to change their
conduct through litigation.104 The role of agent of governance in the
class action setting seems to be particularly appealing to many named
plaintiffs, permitting them to seek remedies that the legal system does
not actually provide (i.e., compelling all members of a particular
industry, not merely the defendant, to change their practices). This sense
of empowerment was evident in the responses of the following named
plaintiffs, including one whose class action was not certified, leaving
him to regret the lost opportunity to “be somebody”:

102. Interview 1018, supra note 74.
103. See Bies and Taylor, supra note 56.
104. See Hadfield, supra note 63, at 674.
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When you take on a company that big . . . I guess my old motto these
days is money talks and horse manure walks. Yeah, I think we
accomplished something. And I guess, I get tired whether it’s politics
or . . . when people don’t say anything but when you got numbers it
does work, instead of letting them walk on you.105
[Not having the class certified] was a big disappointment for us
because we were psyched to really go. It would have been in the
newspaper. We could have been somebody.106

The staying power of the named plaintiffs’ goals is also consistent
with the literature on individual cases. As Relis notes, individual
plaintiffs continue to harbor non-monetary goals throughout the lawsuit,
though they do not articulate those goals to their lawyers because the
lawyers communicate the legal system’s inability to fulfill them.107 And
while the interviews for this study suggest a similar constancy of
motivation (and in some cases a deepened collective justice motivation),
there was no suggestion by any named plaintiffs that they needed to keep
those goals under wraps. Indeed, as we will see in the discussion of
dispute transformation later in this article, many plaintiffs’ class action
lawyers see it as part of their professional responsibility to encourage the
named plaintiffs to maintain and even expand on their collective justice
motivations as the case proceeds.
2. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Goals
Like most of the named plaintiffs, nearly all of the lawyers
interviewed for this study articulated a variety of motivations for filing
the lawsuit. Nearly all listed both obtaining monetary relief for the class
and stopping or altering the defendant’s behavior as their goal in
pursuing the class action. As one lawyer put it, “Our goals were to get
restitution for the class of the money that was seized [by a tax
preparation company] and to stop the practice [debt collection] going
forward.”108 The other responses articulated by more than two lawyers
included obtaining attorneys’ fees/getting paid, which was mentioned by
five (of thirty-three), and affecting conduct throughout the relevant
industry, which was mentioned by two lawyers. The following
comments are representative of the latter goal:
105. Telephone Interview 30041 (Dec. 1, 2009) (class action manufacturer of agricultural
product for misrepresentation).
106. Interview 30043, supra note 84.
107. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 735, 741-42.
108. Telephone Interview 30050 (Apr. 1, 2009).
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Our goals were at best to get back 100 cents on the dollar and to
effectively stop the practice, which was endemic in the industry.109
I wanted to impact the biggest player in the industry and their policies
and hopefully tangentially affect the rest of the industry overall. I was
secretly desirous in that case of getting a court to actually say you can’t
charge [a particular insurance fee] if it’s not in the contract and I got it
and that was an important thing for me.110

Among the less frequently articulated lawyer goals was resolving
the case as efficiently and expeditiously as possible,111 obtaining a cy
pres award112, championing the cause of the class of plaintiffs,113 and a
desire to “get” the defendant.114 It is striking that this range of responses
mirrors very closely the breadth and complexity of the goals articulated
by the named plaintiffs, from personal financial recovery (individual
compensation for the plaintiffs, attorneys fees for the lawyers) to
righting a wrong, to the hope that the class action will affect corporate
behavior beyond the defendant in the case.
Nearly all of the lawyers interviewed indicated that their goals
remained constant throughout the course of the lawsuit. The most
common exception to this pattern was when injunctive relief either
became impossible (because the business shut down) or moot (because
the defendant voluntarily altered its practices). In those cases, the
lawyer’s goal shifted to monetary compensation alone. 115 In addition,
one lawyer indicated that his desire to “get” the defendant increased as
the case went on, while another stated that, as the case progressed, the
objective of stopping the company’s practices became more

109. Telephone Interview 1007 (Oct. 24, 2008) (class action against debt collection practices
by retailers).
110. Telephone Interview 30020 (Feb. 3, 2009) (class action against insurance company for an
unauthorized fee). This lawyer added, “I don’t think my client cared much about the law being
developed that way.” She was right. Her client’s only stated goal was “to get full insurance
coverage.” Interview 30039, supra note 76.
111. Telephone Interview 1003 (Oct. 21, 2008); Telephone Interview 1002 (Oct. 10, 2008);
Telephone Interview 1007, supra note 109.
112. Interview 30020, supra note 110.
113. Interview 30049, supra note 132.
114. Interview 30012, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 24, 2008).
115. Interview 1008, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 24, 2008) (class action against Internet service
provider for defective service); Telephone Interview 1016 (Nov. 26, 2008) (class action against real
estate company for misrepresentation); Interview 30023 (Mar. 9, 2009) (class action against
condominium developer for ordinance violations).
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important.116 These reasons for intensification of collective justice goals
are similar to those articulated by the named plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs’ lawyers’ stated goals are consistent with traditional
notions of progressive cause lawyering. As Scheingold and Sarat note,
“cause lawyers identify explicitly, and without apologies, with
[objectives that transcend service to clients].”117 This observation
assumes a distinction between service to clients and service to a larger
cause. Indeed, much of the cause lawyering literature assumes that there
is a bright line between the interests of the clients and the interests of the
cause.118 This assumption is based on the general perception that most
clients only care about obtaining monetary compensation or other forms
of individual relief for the harm they have suffered, while cause lawyers
strive for some larger social good. As one lawyer put it:
I think that all consumer protection lawyers take themselves and their
role in society a lot more seriously than the clients generally do.
That’s just true. We do. We all consider ourselves like self-appointed
regulators. I don’t make apologies about it. I think it’s a necessary
role in society. I think there’s nobody else doing it. I will say that our
clients don’t feel as strongly about that as we do.119

However, the data from this study suggest that this supposedly clear
distinction between client and cause becomes obscured in the consumer
class action context. Most of the lawyers interviewed did not recognize
or articulate any need to transcend or ignore the goals of their clients,
because they endeavor to ensure that those clients had goals beyond
simply receiving monetary relief for themselves. In this way, service to
the cause and service to the client by class action lawyers become one
and the same. As a result, the normal tension between client and cause
presumed by much of the cause lawyering literature is far less
pronounced in the class action context than in individual cases.

116. Interview 30012, supra note 114 (class action against credit card company for abusive
debt collection practices); Interview 1011 (class action against mortgage broker for illegal loans)
(Nov. 13, 2008).
117. Scheingold & Sarat, supra note 8, at 6.
118. One exception to this pattern is Corey Shdaimah’s Intersecting Identities: Cause Lawyers
as Legal Professionals and Social Movement Actors, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006), in which she observes that many legal services
lawyers view serving their clients and pursuing the cause of social justice as one and the same.
119. Interview 30020, supra note 110.
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3. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Perceptions of Named Plaintiffs’ Goals
The lawyers interviewed for the study were asked to describe the
named plaintiffs’ goals in filing the lawsuit. The most striking aspect of
their aggregate responses is how closely they track the aggregate
response of the named plaintiffs to the question about their own goals.
Like the named plaintiffs themselves, most of the lawyers attributed
multiple goals to their clients. The average number of named plaintiff
goals identified by lawyers was 2.1, the median was 2, and the mode was
2 (the figures for the named plaintiffs’ self identification of goals was an
average of 2.3, a median of 2, and a mode of 2). Moreover, the lawyers
attributed roughly the same distribution of individual and collective
justice goals to their named plaintiffs as the named plaintiffs attributed
to themselves. Thus, for example, twenty-four of the twenty-nine
lawyers (83%) who specifically identified named plaintiff goals said that
their clients harbored collective justice goals, while seventeen of twenty
named plaintiffs (85%) self-identified collective justice goals. And
while 48% of the lawyers attributed a combination of self-interest and
collective justice goals to their clients, 50% of the named plaintiffs
attributed such a combination to themselves. This correlation between
the named plaintiffs’ self-identification of goals and the attorneys’
speculation as to those goals is also present when we look only at the
responses of those attorneys whose clients were included in the study.120
Lawyers’ descriptive comments about named plaintiffs’ goals
underscore their awareness of the overlapping and complex array of
those goals, particularly those relating to the named plaintiffs’ desire for
collective justice. They also demonstrate the attorneys’ awareness of the
named plaintiffs’ anger towards the defendant:
They were really offended.
This often happens with class
representatives. They want to see justice done. 121
Well, you know, she was kind of the ideal main plaintiff. Just really
pissed off when she found out she had gotten screwed.122
They were all upset. In these kinds of cases, almost all of the FDCPA
[Fair Debt Collection Practices Act] class action litigation I’ve done
. . . the plaintiffs are always upset and scared by the letters they get and

120. For example, the average number of named plaintiff goals identified by lawyers whose
clients participated in the study was 1.9, the median was 2 and the mode was 2.
121. Telephone Interview 1015 (Nov. 24, 2008) (class action against bank for overcharging on
car insurance).
122. Interview 1007, supra note 109.
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then they’re outraged when they find out that what the letters say is
bogus. And so their goals are always, “We want to stop this.” Now
whether it’s out of the sense of personal vindictiveness or the greater
social good I couldn’t tell you, but their goals are to stop this.123
I think he was interested in it primarily for doing the right thing. He
likes cars. He’s kind of a car guy. He takes pride in this particular car
and he felt that if there was a defect out there that could cause harm to
people. And people had in fact been killed in this car, civilians and
police officers because of high impact collisions that had caused fires.
He felt that if there was something he could do about it and working
with attorneys to do it he’d be interested in doing that.”124

And even where lawyers attributed a greater self-interest motive to
their clients, they often placed it within the larger context of a desire for
respect and fair treatment. As one lawyer noted:
I think [the named plaintiff] was mad as hell at his insurance company
and that it had hurt him financially so it was very, very similar to the
same kind of motivations you would see in an individual case as
opposed to a class action case because there was so much money
involved for him. Five grand was a lot and he was pissed . . . . He
wanted his money. And he, more than anything, like so many people,
it’s just being disrespected and a lack of customer service that it’s
[about] hurt feelings . . . . And they don’t like being told that they’re
insignificant and that what they have to say doesn’t matter and that
they can be pushed around.125

This awareness of named plaintiff motivation is particularly
noteworthy because most of the lawyers in the study said that they spend
less time communicating with named plaintiffs than they do with their
clients in individual cases.
One lawyer attributed the relative
infrequency of communication with named plaintiffs to the relatively
modest individual monetary reward at stake in most class actions:
Well, typically in a class action the plaintiffs have less at stake
economically or otherwise than they would in an individual case. So,
if there’s less at stake the person tends to be less involved, less
concerned. It’s not like their whole life turns around the resolution of
the lawsuit. For example, if you represent someone in a personal
123. Interview 30017, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 26, 2008) (class action against debt collection
company for standard form collection letters).
124. Telephone Interview 30046 (Nov. 4, 2009) (class action against car manufacturer for
design defect). Interestingly, the named plaintiff in this case stated that his only goal was to get his
own car fixed. Interview 30037, supra note 75.
125. Interview 30020, supra note 110.
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injury case that’s been in an automobile accident and they’re trying to
receive compensation for their medical expenses and to go on with
their life they have a great deal of focus on the litigation. Whereas if
you represent someone in a consumer class action where they might
have been overcharged $15 their stake in the litigation is not as
great.126

Another lawyer felt that communicating with the named plaintiff
was often futile:
The other thing about communicating with clients around class actions
that I find is often times you can give them all the details as to the ins
and outs as to what’s going on with the law and the case, and the
statute, and the procedure and so on. . . . And sometimes you get the
sense that it’s going in one ear and out the other to some extent.
Because they’re not really familiar with everything but you try to break
it down and explain it as best as you can.127

One would expect this less frequent and sometimes frustrating
communication between lawyers and class representatives to exacerbate
the disconnect over client goals that Relis and others have observed
between lawyers and clients in individual cases.128 Why, then, do the
class action lawyers in this study seem to be acutely aware of the range
and complexity of the named plaintiff’s goals, including the desire for
justice that many lawyers in individual cases either ignore or try to
repress in their clients?
The clearest explanation is that the lawyers usually want named
plaintiffs with an array of goals, particularly collective justice goals, as
well as a sense of anger or injustice directed towards the defendant.
Such motivations render these named plaintiffs more likely to endure the
lengthy litigation process and the temptation to accept early settlement
offers that would provide them with individual compensation but leave
the rest of the class without a recovery and their lawyer with only a
modest fee. And because the lawyers are often able to choose from a
number of potential named plaintiffs, they can typically find one who
harbors collective justice goals.129 The following statements from

126. Telephone Interview 30024 (Mar. 6, 2009) (class action against landlord for violation of
rent control laws).
127. Interview 30046, supra note 124.
128. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 734-35.
129. As one lawyer explained: “[F]rom the literally hundreds of people who had called us
[about the defendant’s practice] we selected some people to interview [as named plaintiffs].”
Interview 1008, supra note 115.
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lawyers suggest that this is exactly the kind of person they seek as a
named plaintiff:
I want someone with a fire in the belly, because the money isn’t in
it.130
The people who make the best class reps are people who have a sense
of justice and care for something beyond their self-interest.131
I’m trying to gauge why the person is involved in the case. I don’t
have a problem with somebody who is looking to make money . . . But
I’m also looking for some sort of spark: ‘I’ve been pushed too far; I’m
just not going to take it anymore . . . I want to stand up for myself and
for some others.’ Because I find that those plaintiffs are much more
resolute in seeing a case through.132

On the other hand, many of the lawyers expressed strong
reservations about named plaintiffs who are certain from the beginning
that they want to lead a class action:
If a guy walks in the office and says, ‘ABC happened to me and, boy,
is this a great class action. Let me tell you why,’ as a lawyer your
antenna goes up right away: ‘Well, wait a minute. Is this guy angling
for something?’133
You don’t want somebody that calls you up wanting to file a class
action. I suppose there are exceptions to that rule, but I’ve had people
call me and think they are going to get rich filing a class action, or they
think that just because they got cheated somebody ought to have a
class action filed against them. Lay people don’t have much of a
concept of what’s involved.134
[The named plaintiff] needs to not have a personal agenda.135

Thus, it appears that in choosing a suitable class representative,
consumer class action lawyers seek someone willing to represent large
numbers of persons but who was unaware of such willingness before

130. Interview 30013, supra note 37 (class action against airline company to recover employee
benefits).
131. Telephone Interview 1012 (Nov. 17, 2008) (class action against credit insurance company
for excessive interest charges).
132. Telephone Interview 30049 (Sept. 18, 2009) (class action against agricultural products
company).
133. Telephone Interview 1013 (Nov. 26, 2009) (class action against debt collection company
for standard form dunning letter).
134. Interview 1012, supra note 131.
135. Interview 30050, supra note 108.
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they talked to the lawyer. The lawyers find it easier to keep such named
plaintiffs focused throughout the typically long class action process.
A second explanation for the lawyers’ acute awareness of their
clients’ collective justice goals is that in many cases those goals are
instilled and nurtured by the lawyers themselves. This nurturing process
is a form of dispute transformation, though of a very different sort than
the transformation that has been observed in individual disputes. As
noted earlier, the dispute transformation theory posits that lawyers in
individual cases condition their clients as to the “legal realities” of the
litigation system so that those clients will be satisfied with monetary
compensation for their injuries and abandon previously held desires for
other forms of retribution or recourse.136 The data gathered for this
article suggests that class action lawyers engage in a form of dispute
transformation markedly different from that associated with individual
cases, but no less important for reaching an outcome that is mutually
acceptable to both lawyer and client. Class action lawyers see
themselves as needing to cultivate and encourage what they perceive as
the collective justice goals of their clients, rather than discourage those
goals by transforming them into purely financial objectives, which is the
typical pattern in individual cases. For if the named plaintiff is—or
becomes—only interested in personal financial gain, he or she would be
easily attracted by a relatively small settlement offer and the class
action—and the significant attorneys’ fees that normally accompany it—
would be jeopardized.
The interviews for this article suggest that this transformation
process occurs at as many as three different stages throughout the course
of a class action, depending on the nature of the case and the
sophistication of the client. The first of these stages involves informing
potential named plaintiffs that they have a legal claim and an
opportunity for monetary damages in the first place. Many plaintiffs in
consumer protection cases are initially unaware that they are entitled to
monetary relief; their only goal is to stop the offending conduct as it is
applied to them, be it a harassing debt collection phone call, the
repossession of their car, or an erroneous entry on their credit report.
Only after they consult with an attorney do they realize that the
applicable law permits prevailing plaintiffs to recover statutory damages
and attorneys’ fees, regardless of whether they have actually sustained
any direct financial harm as a result of the defendant’s conduct. This is
particularly true in the debt collection area, where Congress (as well as
136. Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 704-05.
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many state legislatures) recognized the need for statutory damages as a
deterrent against abusive collection activities, even when the debtor
could not prove any resulting monetary loss.137
Two of the plaintiffs’ lawyers described this first stage of dispute
transformation as follows:
[The named plaintiff] really didn’t know that she had been taken
advantage of. I told her that.138
[The named plaintiff] was aware that the purchase price that they paid
for a vehicle was several thousand dollars more than the book value
. . . . I had had other clients who had . . . this issue with [the defendant]
and I had brought several suits against them for doing this . . . . [The
named plaintiff’s] complaint was that they thought they had overpaid
for the car. In reality they did, but not nearly as much as they thought
they did. The reason why the purchase price was higher was because
of the inflated down payment . . . . We would have brought them in
and explained to them what happened and told them that the real harm
here was the sales tax . . . .139

Once the named plaintiff is aware of a potential monetary recovery
(having known of it previously or been so informed by her attorney),
most of the lawyers in this study then move to the second phase of
dispute transformation in the class action context: they transform the
dispute from individual compensation to relief for the entire class, be it
monetary or injunctive. In most cases, this stage is necessary because
pursuing such a dispute on an individual level is financially unfeasible
for the attorney:
I mean what they were looking for was legal help to get their money
back. That’s why they came asking for help. And we helped to
channel that goal into a wider goal and when offered the possibility of
helping others that had been similarly treated and ripped off they were
very, very interested in doing that. That’s not what they came in
seeking, ‘I want to file a class action.’ No. They came in, ‘I’m getting
ripped off by someone.’ And then when they learn that many others
have . . . sought help and that there is a legal device available whereby
they can through their own lawsuit help others in the same situation
they were eager to proceed on that basis. So, I think there was a lot of

137. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (2006); WIS. STAT. §
427 (2009).
138. Telephone Interview 1009 (Nov. 7, 2008) (class action against finance company for
excessive re-financing fees).
139. Interview 1001 (Sept. 29, 2009) (class action against automobile dealership for excessive
sales tax fee).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

39

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 3

8_MEILI_WESTERN.DOC

106

2/11/20119:52 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:67

public interest on the part of the named plaintiff that they eagerly
embraced despite the fact that that’s not what brought them into the
office in the first place.140

According to this attorney, the named plaintiff harbored latent
collective justice goals that the lawyer encouraged by discussing the
possibility of a class action. Other lawyers similarly described this
process of channeling their named plaintiff’s desire for justice into a
willingness to serve as a class representative:
Well, she filed the lawsuit because . . . in her case they [a rent-to-own
company] were trying to repossess some furniture, a TV, and a
computer from her and she felt like she had come to realize that she
had been not fairly treated. And so that’s why she showed up and we
said, ‘Look, you know doing your lawsuit for a few hundred bucks is
just, you can’t do it. It doesn’t make sense. But we think that this
company is violating the law with all of its customers like you and
would you be willing to stand up as a class representative?’ And she
was.141
I think that my view of human nature is that most people want to do
good. I mean they’re interested in themselves, but they also want to do
a broader good. They also want to have some meaning in their lives,
and when you discuss with them the statistics, demonstrating that this
is industry wide, this gives them a greater reason to go through this
process.142
I think that when the client first came to see me [about a dispute with a
car dealership over a salvaged vehicle] she really had no idea that there
was a class action potential [regarding excessive registration fees].
Now having said that, when I explained it to her, I think my client was
very much motivated in seeking justice for everybody in her similar
position because obviously she had been wronged by the dealership
and she wanted to see justice done.143

These statements reveal a deliberate, conscious, and unapologetic
transformation of the clients’ dispute by the plaintiffs’ lawyers. They
suggest that this stage of the dispute transformation process is a matter
of appealing to the named plaintiffs’ underlying, though perhaps
140. Interview 1016, supra note 115.
141. Telephone Interview 1014 (Dec. 2, 2008) (class action against rent-to-own company
regarding repossession practices).
142. Interview 2002, supra note 37 (class action against a mortgage company for
misrepresentation).
143. Telephone Interview 1005 (Nov. 26, 2008) (class action against automobile dealership for
overcharging registration fees).
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unstated, desire to seek justice for large numbers of persons. It also
frequently involves the lawyers altering the underlying nature of the
dispute (e.g., from individual concerns over the named plaintiff’s
salvaged vehicle to a class-wide dispute about excessive registration
fees). And for the most part, the named plaintiffs interviewed for this
study were willing recipients of those appeals. For example the client of
the lawyer who made the latter statement said that she was only aware of
the class action implications of her dispute when her lawyer brought it to
her attention:
I think it was six months after I filed my lawsuit that’s when my
lawyer saw the need for a class action suit. I was like ‘OK, let’s get
that money and return it to the people that they stole it from’; the
registration fees.144

Another lawyer described this channeling process as an effort to
meld the named plaintiff’s goals to his own. And if that effort is
unsuccessful (and assuming the lawyer has other potential named
plaintiffs from which to choose), the un-transformable client is rejected
as a named plaintiff:
I think that our client’s goals when they first contacted us were
certainly different. They had no idea we were going to be talking
about a class action. They had very little idea of what a class action
was but I think that through my initial meeting process that our goals
were the same. And my intake process is designed to achieve that
result and if it doesn’t then we don’t go forward.145

One attorney’s response was particularly interesting in this regard
because of his awareness that being a named plaintiff entails enduring a
significant amount of time, effort, and abuse from defendant’s counsel:
The system is set up so that you pretty much have to be an idiot to be
willing to be a class rep. Well, in a consumer case anyway, where the
amount at issue for any normal person is going to be fairly small
whether its $10 or $100 or $200 because it is really irrelevant. But
people get angry and they feel like they want to do something. But the
truth of the matter is that the amount of time that it’s going to take
them to do it and the near certainty that they’ll have to spend a day
giving a deposition and the possibility that they may have to testify in
court or find documents that are difficult to find and take a lot of
looking and they can’t even conceive of why it has anything to do with

144. Interview 30027, supra note 89.
145. Interview 1001, supra note 139.
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the case that they thought they had. And the fact that the cases go on
for so long, which is just kind of inconceivable to an ordinary person
unless they’ve had other exposure to litigation, and from some kind of
purely rational economic sense even the possibility of an incentive
award, which is uncertain of course. I mean it doesn’t balance out all
these disadvantages. And then, of course, you have to make them
understand that if they file the case as a class action they have a
responsibility on behalf of all class members that their case can’t just
be settled by using the class as leverage. And the only thing that’s
going to make them want to do it enough so that they’re willing to
serve is a desire to perform a public service for people. I’ve had pretty
good luck persuading people of that.146

This lawyer’s detailed cost-benefit analysis illustrates why a purely
economic model for named plaintiff behavior in the class action context
falls short: it cannot measure the intangible value of wanting to see
justice done for the public generally. Indeed, the named plaintiff in this
case developed a sense of public service (buttressed by considerable
anger) after her lawyers told her about what the defendant was doing to
others:
I wanted blood. Particularly when I found out what [the defendant
was] doing to the other class [members]. I didn’t feel damaged but
then when I heard about the elderly people. They were an awful
company with huge interest rates and big late payments . . . they were
horrible over the phone . . . .147

Other named plaintiffs expressed a similar sense of willingness to
have their goals transformed, or widened, to include relief for the entire
class:
[Our attorneys] made clear that their expectation of us was that we
were going to go all the way with it and that they made clear that there
was not going to be a lot of money in it. You’re doing it for everybody
not for your own glory or remuneration.148
I started out and all I wanted was my $8,000 and he said, “Well, that’s
not enough” so they went up to, I don’t know what it was, 30 or 40 and
next thing I know the last papers I looked at I was suing for $225,000.
Well, they ended up putting it all together in a class action suit which

146. Interview 30011, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 24, 2008) (class action against credit card
company for abusive debt collection practices).
147. Interview 30028, supra note 78.
148. Interview 30043, supra note 84.
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is fine, I didn’t want $225,000. I wanted the $8,000 I was promised
. . . .149

None of the named plaintiffs in this study expressed the resentment
that “transformed” clients feel in individual cases when their desires for
justice are either ignored or channeled into monetary compensation.150
Quite the contrary: whether they approach their attorneys with
knowledge of the scope of the defendant’s conduct and a wish to
prohibit it, or whether they were initially only concerned at the outset
about their personal situation, they relish the idea of assisting a broad
group of consumers. It plays into their sense of right and wrong, and
illustrates their interest in being agents of governance.
Those
uninterested in adopting a broader view of the dispute are unlikely to be
selected as named plaintiffs in the first place, assuming the lawyer has a
choice in the matter.
The third phase of dispute transformation in the consumer class
action context occurs when it is necessary for the lawyers to ensure that
the named plaintiffs “stay the course” throughout the frequently
protracted class action process. As described by the lawyers, this phase
of the process resembles a form of cheerleading or encouragement,
rather than transformation:
Their goals remain consistent but in a case like this [involving a
standard form debt collection letter] they’re not really required to have
very much involvement. So the anger they had in 1996 when they got
the letter is that they may have to be reminded about five years later
when they have to make a decision about the case. I try to maintain
contact with them to essentially get them to keep their head in the
game. But they have their lives. I mean I’m spending hundreds of
thousands of hours on these cases and they’re spending 15 hours
spread out over five years so they have their lives going on. They’re
very upset when they see me and whenever they think about the
situation they get upset again, but they spend 99.9% of their life not
thinking about the case which is not the same as me.151

Some of the lawyers consciously deal with this problem at the
outset of the case, and whenever their clients become frustrated with
litigation delays:

149. Interview 30040, supra note 89.
150. See SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 3, at 93; Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note
4.
151. Interview 30017, supra note 123.
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You know, I talk to the clients a lot. I let them know I’m available to
them anytime they are frustrated with the process. Go ahead and give
me a call and we’ll talk about it. And I also try very hard at the
beginning of the case, once someone has agreed to become a class
representative, which I am really up front about in terms of what their
responsibilities are going to be and that it is not a glorified position . . .
And I try to tell them early on that this is going to seem like it grinds
very slowly, and there is a chance that we could get derailed, you
know, there could be something that happens on a motion to dismiss
that either really hurts our side or really hurts their side, and the party
that feels aggrieved by that decision decides to take it to the court of
appeals. If that happens, the entire case can get sidetracked until the
court of appeals decides whatever that issue is . . . . So I try to get them
to understand that, yeah, this could go a little bit sideways for a while.
And that they’ve got to be patient. And then I feel my duty is to be
available to them when they get frustrated with the system.152
Sometimes these cases drag on or slow down that the second or third
time I say it, it kind of reinforces, ‘yeah, this is what I signed on for
and it’s really no surprise.’ I also try to emphasize what brought them
into the case in the front end that they were frustrated about something
or they wanted to champion something larger than their own cause.153

Another lawyer related a similar process of encouragement, linking
it to the goal of ensuring that the representative plaintiffs not become
attracted by “pick off” settlement offers (i.e., relatively modest offers
usually proffered early in the case) that would more than compensate the
named plaintiff for her monetary loss but would derail the class action
by disqualifying her as inadequate under Federal Rule 23(a) or its state
court equivalent:
When I talk to people from the first time forward, I try to lay out how
this will be difficult. These cases take three to five years, that you’ll
be deposed, that the defendants will raise every procedural and other
hurdle they can think of, that the defendants at some point down the
road will offer you a bribe. They’ll offer me a bribe, the bribe being
individual settlement at a price well above the value of the individual
settlement, or offering me costs and attorney’s fees above what would
possibly be reasonable for an individual case. So in other words, I try
to get them this information in advance, so that when it does happen,

152. Telephone Interview 2007 (Apr. 8, 2008) (class action against trustees of a retirement
benefit plan for breach of fiduciary duty).
153. Interview 30049, supra note 132.
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. . . . ‘Here’s where they’re offering the bribe, and we’ve talked about
this before, where do you stand on this?’154

In this way, class action lawyers try to anticipate and counteract the
tendency of litigation delays to, as Felstiner et al. put it, change
disputants’ views of the process from “useful procedure” to “pointless
frustration.”155 This process of reminding the named plaintiffs about
both the nature of the lawsuit they have agreed to steward, as well as the
responsibilities of that stewardship, is also illustrative of the kind of
control that the dispute transformation literature attributes to attorneys.
In their review of the literature on this subject, Sarat and Felstiner note
that in many practice settings, “lawyers exercise power by manipulating
their clients’ definitions of the situation and of their role.”156 This study
provides ample evidence of this exercise of power by class action
attorneys over named plaintiffs. Indeed, given that class action lawyers
often have the luxury of selecting named plaintiffs who are willing to
align their goals with the attorneys, this power is more pronounced in
class actions than in individual cases, where the client normally chooses
the lawyer.
As many of the comments above suggest, at the start of the process,
many named plaintiffs are unaware of the nature and scope of the
underlying case. And certainly most of them are ignorant of the duties
of a class representative. Their lawyers fill those gaps in knowledge,
thus transforming the clients’ “definition of the situation and of their
role”157 in a way that increases the likelihood that the case will achieve
the results sought by the attorney and the client.
In addition, this conscious encouragement process is another way in
which lawyers, according to Relis, “condition clients on ‘legal system
realities.’”158 But in the class action context, the purpose of this
conditioning is less about persuading clients to minimize their
aspirations of what they might be able to achieve through the legal
system. Rather, it is just the opposite: to encourage them to maintain
the broadly focused aspirations that made them willing to serve as a
named plaintiff in the first place, often after first learning of the
opportunity from their attorney.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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Despite this general awareness and conscious shaping of named
plaintiff goals, there was one such motivation that the lawyers never
mentioned: the desire to obtain information about the defendant’s
practices. Four named plaintiffs listed it as a goal, but none of the
lawyers (including those who represented those four named plaintiffs)
attributed it to their clients. While perhaps simply an anomaly of this
particular study sample, one other explanation is that lawyers see
information gathering as a regular part of the litigation process, the
means to a successfully resolved case. It is not, however, an end in
itself. Indeed, none of the lawyers identified it as one of their own goals
in initiating their class action. Some named plaintiffs, on the other hand,
see it differently. They, like their counterparts’ individual cases, often
want an explanation for the defendant’s conduct and feel that a lawsuit is
a good way to obtain it. Lawyers likely assume that they need no such
explanation; they assume that the reason for the defendant’s conduct is
the desire to make a profit, sometimes illegally.
The majority of lawyers also felt that the named plaintiff’s goals
did not change throughout the course of the lawsuit, which accurately
reflects the unchanging view of most of the named plaintiffs themselves.
To the extent that the lawyers perceived such a change, for the most part
they attributed it to the fulfillment of certain goals, the discovery of
additional information about the defendant’s actions giving rise to the
lawsuit, or the conduct of the defendant or its attorney during the course
of the litigation. Thus, for example, a lawyer representing a class of
consumers who alleged breach of warranty for faulty brakes stated that
the named plaintiffs were initially only interested in either a cash refund
or new car. But as the case went on, he noted, “the plaintiff’s goals
changed to just getting justice. Money was less of a goal, though it was
still important.”159 And another plaintiffs’ attorney, who represented a
class of consumers alleging that their former employer breached its
fiduciary duty with respect to their retirement benefits, indicated that
while at first the named plaintiffs were only interested in recovering the
value of their benefits, they eventually wanted the defendant’s corporate
officers to go to jail once they became aware of a parallel criminal
investigation.160 Other attorneys indicated that the named plaintiffs
became angrier as a result of what they perceived as being subjected to
harassment during the course of the case, usually during the their
deposition. One lawyer summarized this phenomenon as follows:

159. Interview 2003 (Mar. 28, 2008).
160. Interview 2007, supra note 152.
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When they get [personally] attacked like that [in depositions] usually
the clients will turn on the defendant and say, ‘See, that’s exactly that
arrogance, that rude callous indifference to what you do to people and
your actions is exactly why I’m bringing the class action against you.
And now you ain’t seen nothing yet.’ And they’ll start sticking to their
guns and they’ll get rougher and tougher the more that the case goes
on. Which makes it kind of fun because it is sometimes very hard to
get people to get motivated about consumer issues because they just
don’t tend to rip people’s lives apart.161

In sum, this study’s empirical data on goals suggest that named
plaintiffs are similar to plaintiffs in individual cases in that they seek an
array of outcomes from litigation that go beyond monetary
compensation and fall within the general rubric of justice being done.
They maintain and sometimes intensify these motivations during the
litigation process. And, also similar to plaintiffs in individual cases,
they sometimes seek remedies that a lawsuit cannot provide, such as
changed corporate behavior throughout a particular industry. On the
other hand, their lawyers are more aware of these non-monetary goals
than lawyers in individual cases. Indeed, these class action lawyers
actively seek out named plaintiffs willing to broaden their desire for
individual relief into efforts to seek justice for all class members. The
lawyers then nurture and encourage those collective justice goals
throughout the course of the lawsuit. This nurturing process typically
begins when the lawyers first discuss the possibility of a class action
with the client, and continues through the duration of the lawsuit. The
lawyers frequently remind the named plaintiffs of the larger social
justice purpose behind the case to prevent the named plaintiff from
losing interest. These conversations, even if less frequent than
communications between lawyer and client in individual cases, both
reinforce the named plaintiffs’ collective justice goals and make the
lawyers acutely aware of them.
B.

Comparative Analysis of Satisfaction with the Case Result

The named plaintiffs’ reasons for being satisfied with the result of
their class action tracked their goals in filing it. However, the lawyers
were not as fully aware of the range of these reasons as they were about
the named plaintiffs goals.

161. Interview 30020, supra note 110.
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1. Named Plaintiffs’ Satisfaction
Most of the named plaintiffs expressed satisfaction with the result
of the class action. This is not surprising, given that their lawyers
selected the case that was the subject of the interview and, for the most
part, selected cases featuring ostensibly successful results. However, the
reasons for that satisfaction, as well as their lawyers’ perceptions of the
reasons for that satisfaction, are intriguing. Of particular note is the
progression in attitudes and expectations from stated goals to reasons for
satisfaction.
In the aggregate, the named plaintiffs’ reasons for being either
satisfied or dissatisfied with the result of the case mirrored their goals for
pursuing the case. For example, while thirteen named plaintiffs included
self-interest (such as monetary compensation or a repaired product)
within their goals for pursuing the case, twelve named plaintiffs reported
being satisfied with the result because of those reasons. Similarly, while
seventeen named plaintiffs identified some form of collective justice as
at least one goal in filing the class action, all twenty of the interviewed
named plaintiffs cited collective justice reasons for being either satisfied
or dissatisfied with the result.162 These collective justice reasons for
satisfaction included monetary compensation for the entire class,
stopping the offending practice, demonstrating that the defendants’
conduct was wrong, and serving notice on other companies in the
relevant industry that the offending conduct would not be tolerated.
Similarly, while ten of the named plaintiffs articulated both self-interest
and collective justice goals, eleven of the named plaintiffs were satisfied
for a combination of these reasons. Not surprisingly then, the named
plaintiffs’ reasons for satisfaction or dissatisfaction were nearly as
overlapping and complex as their goals. The average number of such
reasons was 1.9, the median was 2, and the mode was 2. The
corresponding figures for number of goals were 2.3, 2 and 2.
However, when we look inside these aggregate numbers, and
compare them with the named plaintiffs’ goals, interesting patterns
emerge. First, while non-monetary collective justice goals (such as
stopping the offending conduct) were listed by nearly twice as many
named plaintiffs as monetary collective justice goals (i.e., obtaining
162. The three named plaintiffs who expressed dissatisfaction with the case stated collective
justice reasons: two were disappointed that the class was not certified (even though they received a
monetary settlement for their individual claims) and one wanted “a stiffer penalty” against the
defendant company and its executives. Interview 30032, supra note 91; Interview 30042, supra
note 90 (class action against mortgage company for misrepresentation; Interview 30043, supra note
84.
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monetary compensation for the entire class), those proportions nearly
reversed themselves when named plaintiffs articulated reasons for being
satisfied with the results of the case:
twelve cited monetary
compensation as a reason for being satisfied or dissatisfied with the
result, while eight cited non-monetary collective justice reasons. This is
likely because class-wide monetary compensation was either the only, or
the most noticeable, form of relief obtained in the case.
Second, tracking the shift from named plaintiffs’ goals to reasons
for satisfaction with the result reveals that named plaintiffs become more
interested in collective justice than individual recovery as the case
progresses. For example, of the eleven satisfied named plaintiffs who
had expressed self-interest goals for initiating the lawsuit, only seven
said that they were satisfied for self-interested reasons. The other four
said they were satisfied for collective justice reasons. On the other hand,
all of the fifteen satisfied named plaintiffs who had expressed collective
justice goals were satisfied for collective justice reasons. Furthermore,
of the ten satisfied named plaintiffs who had expressed a combination of
self-interest and collective justice goals, six were satisfied for a
combination of self-interest and collective justice reasons, and four were
satisfied for purely collective justice reasons. None were satisfied for
only self-interest reasons. Indeed, the only named plaintiff who was
satisfied for purely self-interest reasons was one of the three named
plaintiffs who had articulated only a self-interest goal. The other two
were satisfied for a combination of self-interest and collective justice
reasons.
This shift in focus from self-interest to collective justice is likely
the result of a number of factors revealed through interviews, including a
greater awareness of—and anger about—the defendant’s conduct as
information becomes available through discovery, the dispute
transformation process alluded to above, and the sense of satisfaction at
having helped to achieve a result that spreads relief among a large group
of people.
A third notable observation in the responses regarding satisfaction
is that many named plaintiffs believe that the class action produced
results beyond the specific legal remedies sought in the complaint. One
of these extra-legal remedies was influencing corporate conduct
throughout a particular industry:
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I was satisfied . . . the case was won. The point was made, and I’m
quite sure that the next time around [debt collectors] will look more in
depth at what they’re sending out to others before they give it to
them . . . .163
They won a huge settlement. It was big enough to serve as a warning
to other insurance companies not to engage in this practice.164
[W]hat I found from this was . . . it made other companies…[s]tart
rethinking what they were doing. When I went into [name of store]
there was a big smile on my face because I was seeing the changes
happening based on this lawsuit. It was a really great feeling to see the
changes going on in the industry.165

These statements reveal a faith in the class action as providing not
only tangible relief to the members of a particular class, but justice to all
consumers. Armed with the class action, these named plaintiffs exhibit a
sense of empowerment at having participated in a process they believe
brought about change throughout an entire industry. This is very
different from the feelings of disappointment with the legal system that
many individual litigants feel, even after an ostensibly successful
resolution of their case. Indeed, even where one of the named plaintiffs
was cynical about the ability of the legal system to permanently alter the
behavior of corporations, he nevertheless felt a sense of pride in having
used that flawed system to call the defendant insurance company to task:
I know that they’ll do it again. This is America. You can get away
with anything here. And they’ll do it again . . . . Maybe a few years
down the road but they’ll do it again. I’m glad I brought it [the class
action] about . . . . I’m just glad it happened the way it happened
because an insurance company is an insurance company but when they
do stuff against the American people as a conglomerate they shouldn’t
be able to get away with it. And it really stinks that we have to take
them to court to do stuff like this.166

As this statement suggests, named plaintiffs have a complex and
somewhat conflicted view of the U.S. legal system in the class action
context. On the one hand, they decry its inability to permanently
prohibit corporations from abusing consumers. Yet, on the other hand,

163. Interview 30034, supra note 29.
164. Interview 1017, supra note 84.
165. Interview 30035, supra note 82 (class action against manufacturer of nutritional products
for misrepresentation).
166. Interview 30039, supra note 76.
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there is a resigned but almost patriotic sense that it is the only way to
curb corporate misconduct. Some named plaintiffs thus become
reluctant agents of governance, spurred into action because, in their
view, someone has to hold corporations accountable.
The previous quote is also indicative of the other way in which
many named plaintiffs see the class action providing relief beyond what
is technically available under the law; i.e., as a means of demonstrating
that the defendant was wrong. Indeed, for some named plaintiffs this
sense of vindication was at least as satisfying as the material
compensation for the class:
I did get almost all of what I asked for. And I guess the results were
also that they sat there with, how do I say it, they had cake on their
face when they got done because we were right and they were wrong.
And I was very satisfied monetarily and the way it turned out.167
We won. I’m very satisfied. I don’t know about the dollar amount but
I’m satisfied with what they found, that they were in the wrong
totally.168
It achieved my goal which was to get [the defendants] to recognize and
justify and rectify a problem that they’d caused.169

These comments suggest that many named plaintiffs believe that
their class action was a struggle between right and wrong and that they
were satisfied because “right” won out. It is not surprising that this
sense of right versus wrong is prominent in the class action context,
given the number of claimants and potential recovery involved, the high
public profile of many class action defendants, and the way that
plaintiffs’ attorneys inculcate in the named plaintiff the importance of
looking beyond their self-interest and focusing on what is best for the
entire class. The following statements underscore how many named
plaintiffs see the class action as the last best hope of holding
corporations accountable:
The class action suit is the consumers’ only recourse in many
situations. I believe in government regulations. I do not believe that
major corporations have my best interests at heart in all cases. I don’t
think that corporations care about their customers except for the money
that they can bring in . . . . They will treat them badly if they think they

167. Interview 30040, supra note 89.
168. Interview 30039, supra note 76.
169. Telephone Interview 30038, supra note 78 (class action against automobile manufacturer
for defective part).
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can get away with it and still make money. Part of the reason the legal
system exists is to slap them when they don’t.170
I think the only way that citizens can even stand up to corporations is
through class actions and I doubt that class actions, I mean I’m sure
there are lawyers that maybe try to do class actions to make money but
they wouldn’t get any results if it wasn’t wrong what the company or
the party had done to begin with. I just think it’s a good way for
citizens to keep powerful organizations in check.171

A final noteworthy finding about the progression from goals to
satisfaction was that, while four named plaintiffs said that they filed the
lawsuit, in part, because they wanted to obtain information about the
defendants’ practices, only one stated the receipt of such information as
a reason for their satisfaction with the case.172 This shift is probably due
to a number of factors. First, when the named plaintiffs reflected on
their reasons for being satisfied with the result in the case, they normally
focus on the settlement, rather than on information about the defendant’s
practices which emerged during the discovery process in the midst of the
lawsuit. Second, the named plaintiffs may not have been made aware of
the information that emerged during the discovery process. And third,
some named plaintiffs who want information about the defendant’s
practices are satisfied because, among other things, the case
demonstrated that the defendant was wrong. This was true for one of the
four named plaintiffs in this study interested in obtaining information
about the defendant’s practices.173 These named plaintiffs may have felt
that the information about the defendant’s practices revealed that the
defendant was wrong. For them, successfully achieving the goal of
obtaining information was transformed into satisfaction on the grounds
that the defendant was shown to be in the wrong.
2. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Satisfaction
Given that the lawyers selected the cases on which to focus their
interviews, it is not surprising that the vast majority were satisfied with
the result. Most attributed their satisfaction to obtaining relief for the
class in the form of monetary damages for the class, specific
performance, and/or a cessation of the defendant’s practice. Several also
mentioned their receipt of attorneys’ fees. Three pointed to making
170.
171.
172.
173.

Interview 1018, supra note 74.
Interview 30042, supra note 90.
Interview 30033, supra note 78.
Interview 30034, supra note 29.
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good law through reported opinions on class certification and
substantive law.174 To the extent that the lawyers were dissatisfied with
the result, the most common reason was that they had hoped to recover
more money for the class.
3. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Perceptions of Named Plaintiffs’
Satisfaction
The interviews of lawyers included an open-ended question about
whether—and why—they felt that the named plaintiff was satisfied with
the result in the case. The distribution of lawyers’ responses to that
question suggests that most are well aware of the range of reasons for
named plaintiff satisfaction.175 Thus, the lawyers’ speculation as to their
clients’ reasons for being satisfied or unsatisfied with the result of the
case fell into the same two general categories that the named plaintiffs
identified: self-interest and collective justice. And the latter category
was divided, as it was among the named plaintiffs, into obtaining money
for the entire class and other forms of collective relief such as stopping
the offending practice. The lawyers were twice as likely to identify
collective justice as a reason for the named plaintiffs’ satisfaction as they
were to identify self-interest. This accurately tracked the proportion of
self-interest and collective justice reasons for satisfaction articulated by
the named plaintiffs. It also contrasts with Relis’ conclusion in the
individual medical malpractice case context that most lawyers think that
their clients are mainly interested in money.176 This awareness among
the class action lawyers is not surprising, given the preceding discussion
about how these lawyers shape the named plaintiffs’ collective justice
goals. One would expect these lawyers to attribute named plaintiff
satisfaction to fulfillment of the goals they helped shape.
However, while the lawyers were cognizant of the reasons for client
satisfaction, they somewhat underestimated the complexity and
overlapping nature of those reasons. For example, while four named
plaintiffs were satisfied because the defendant had been proven wrong,
none of the lawyers (including, of course, the lawyers of those particular
named plaintiffs) cited that as a reason for named plaintiff satisfaction.
And, while three named plaintiffs said that they were satisfied, in part,
because the result had served notice on other members of the relevant

174. Interviews 1013, 1016, 30046.
175. Four of the lawyers did not cite a reason for their belief that the named plaintiff was
satisfied with the result in the case.
176. See generally Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4.
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industry, none of their lawyers mentioned this as a reason for their
clients’ satisfaction. These discrepancies suggest that many named
plaintiffs, like the literature tells us is true of their counterparts in
individual cases, have a broader set of expectations about the legal
system than their lawyers think they do. Lawyers focus on the relief that
the legal system can deliver.177 In individual cases that is mostly
monetary compensation, and in class actions it is class-wide monetary
and injunctive relief. Most class action settlements do not, however,
include any admission of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant (quite
the contrary – such settlements usually explicitly state that the defendant
does not admit liability) or admonitions to other members of a particular
industry. These limitations do not, however, deter many named
plaintiffs from believing that the class action achieved those very results.
Taken together, this study’s findings about named plaintiff goals
and satisfaction suggests yet another intriguing twist on dispute
transformation in the class action context: while class action lawyers are
very successful in shaping named plaintiffs’ collective justice goals to
conform to legal system realities (primarily money for the class and
injunctive relief) they cannot control the way that those named plaintiffs
view the result of the case. In individual cases, even where a case is
nominally successful, plaintiffs’ reaction to the result is sometimes
negative because they did not achieve the non-monetary, justice-oriented
goals they harbored throughout the litigation.178 In the class action
context, the effect is quite different, and leads to a more positive reaction
to the litigation process: many named plaintiffs harbor collective justice
goals that extend beyond legal system realities, such as affecting change
throughout an industry, or a vindication of right against wrong. But
unlike plaintiffs in individual cases, named plaintiffs are satisfied
because they believe the class action achieved those extra-legal goals.
C.

Perceptions of Process Fairness

The data gleaned from interviews in this study strongly suggest that
both named plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers evaluate the fairness of the
consumer class action process according to the result in the case. These
findings contradict much of the literature on procedural justice and
process control, while supporting the distributive justice theory.

177. Id. at 702.
178. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4.
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1. Named Plaintiffs’ Perceptions of Fairness
Among the named plaintiffs who felt the process was fair (which
constituted the overwhelming bulk of the interviewees), the most
frequently cited reason was the favorable result in the case. The
following responses to an open-ended question about process fairness
are illustrative179:
Oh yeah, I think [the process was fair]. At least we got something.180
It was fair. Because I had my car fixed.181
I think it was as fair as it could be. [The defendant is] a limited
liability corporation. I would like to have seen more . . . but . . . given
that it was a limited liability organization and certain judgments could
have put them [into bankruptcy], then we would have gotten
nothing.182

The other most common reason cited by named plaintiffs for the
perceived fairness of the process was the competence of their attorney,
though this was typically a result-oriented response. In other words, the
named plaintiffs felt the process was fair because their lawyer produced
a favorable result, either for the named plaintiff personally or the class as
a whole:
Yes [the litigation process was fair]. My lawyer got me the things for
me that I wanted to get out of the lawsuit.183
It was fair because of the way the lawyers handled it.184
Yes [the litigation process was fair]. Because the other side tried
everything, but the judge saw how the public was being taken
advantage of. There were a lot of appeals. But I guess our attorneys
were a lot smarter.185

The latter comment is instructive for two reasons besides the link
between plaintiffs’ attorneys and their client’s perception of process

179. The interview question was as follows: “Leaving aside the actual result of the class action,
do you feel that the litigation process itself was fair in your class action? Why or why not?”
180. Interview 30041, supra note 105.
181. Interview 30037, supra note 75.
182. Interview 30026 supra note89 (class action against condominium developer for ordinance
violations).
183. Interview 30025 (Apr. 1, 2009) (class action against automobile dealership for
overcharging registration fees).
184. Interview 30033, supra note 78.
185. Interview 30028, supra note 78.
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fairness. First, it illustrates the perception that fairness of process
depends on the judge in the case. As we will see shortly, this view is
especially prevalent among attorneys, though far less so among named
plaintiffs, who rarely encounter the judge during a class action. Second,
it reveals the same perception of class action as struggle between right
and wrong that emerged in response to the questions about goals and
satisfaction with the result in the case. In this instance, the named
plaintiff perceived the process as fair, in part, because the judge
understood the larger issues at stake (the defendant’s exploitation of the
public generally, rather than merely the other class members) and was
not distracted by the defendant’s diversionary tactics. According to this
view, the judge is not merely an adjudicator of the dispute between the
class and the defendant; rather, he or she decides more fundamental
issues of collective justice in the face of corporate excess.
Even the two named plaintiffs who were dissatisfied with the result
in their case (because the class was not certified) nevertheless thought
the process was fair because it provided an opportunity for “the little
guy” to stand up to large corporations:
Yeah, I thought the process was great and interesting. Of course, I
would change how it all came out, but I thought that the process was
good. I don’t think anything is wrong with class actions. I think the
only way that citizens can even stand up to corporations is through
class actions.186
[I]t seemed [that it was] as fair as it’s going to be for a little schmuck
. . . . I think [the court is] made for the guys that got the power and the
money, [rather] than . . . the little guys [who] come in and bang their
toes. I didn’t feel shut out and I feel that we would have got a fair
shake and we did get a fair shake as far as we went, as fair as we could
expect.187

These comments are intriguing for a number of reasons. Although
the interview question sought the named plaintiffs’ opinion as to their
particular class action, both chose to discuss the U.S. legal system
generally. And they both suggested (the first more obviously than the
second) that the class action is the only exception to that system’s bias in
favor of moneyed interests over the individual. So here again, even
among named plaintiffs disappointed with the result in their case, we see
an appreciation—even an adulation in some cases—for the class action

186. Interview 30042, supra note 90.
187. Interview 30043, supra note 84.
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as defender of the moral authority of individual interests against those of
corporations.
Only two named plaintiffs referenced actual litigation procedure in
response to the question about fairness of the process. One made a
positive reference to “the formation of the class,”188 and another
complained about a change in venue adversely affecting the case.189 The
paucity of responses about actual procedure is not surprising, given how
little contact most named plaintiffs had with the actual workings of the
case. In fact, one named plaintiff cited his detachment from the case as a
basis for his perception that the process was fair:
Sure [the process was fair]; I never had to go to court or anything. I
guess it was settled out of court. I know I never had to go. As far as I
know if they went to court it was just the lawyers and the judge, I
guess. I didn’t have to do much of anything really. I just sat at home
and waited for them to call me or send me something or whatever.190

The named plaintiffs’ limited role in class actions presents an
alternative explanation for why most named plaintiffs equate fairness of
process with result: they have no other basis for evaluating fairness.
Indeed, one named plaintiff never said whether she thought the process
was fair. Instead, she stated that she never went to court, implying that
she never saw actual court procedures and thus could not evaluate their
fairness.191
To the extent that named plaintiffs felt the process was unfair, the
most commonly stated reason was that it took too long. But any such

188. Interview 1017, supra note 84.
189. Interview 30040, supra note 89.
190. Interview 30036, supra note 77. The lawyers were also very aware of the limited role for
named plaintiffs in most class actions, though they did not cite it as a reason for why the process
was fair. The following comments are illustrative:
There are all sorts of legal issues that come out of [class actions] that really have very
little to do with the main plaintiffs. So, for example is this a certifiable class? I mean
some part of that involves the [named] plaintiff’s understanding but that’s like a tiny part
of it. Really what most of the fight is about is whether legally the kind of claim is one
that should be determined on a class basis . . . . In . . . an individual case you’re just
situated in a place that’s closer to that individual. In a class action . . . you get more
removed from that individual in a particular case and in fact, you’re supposed to be
somewhat removed from that. I don’t see that as a deficiency. It’s just the nature of the
proceeding.
Interview 1016, supra note 115. “The class litigation has its own timeline. It has nothing to do with
the individual [named plaintiff]. For instance, the motion and memorandum in support of the class
certification usually has nothing to do with the individual.” Interview 30044, supra note 29 (class
action challenging a standard form debt collection letter).
191. Interview 30035, supra note 82.
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negative feelings were outweighed by their satisfaction with the overall
result in the case:
It took a little longer than I thought. That was the only thing I thought
was unfair about it.192
It’s onerous. It’s long. Overall with the result, yeah, I’m satisfied with
it but it’s a long drawn out process.193

The named plaintiffs’ responses to the fairness question were
noticeably less overlapping and complex than their responses about
goals and satisfaction. The mean number of reasons cited for fairness
(or lack thereof) was 1.3 (as compared to 2.3 goals and 1.9 reasons for
satisfaction) and both the median and mode for the number of those
responses was 1 (as opposed to 2 for both goals and satisfaction). The
more limited range of responses to the question about fairness attests to
the predominance of case result as the basis for the named plaintiffs’
evaluation of fairness.
On the surface then, the responses of most of the named plaintiffs
were consistent with the distributive justice theory, which posits that
disputants view the fairness of an adjudicative procedure in terms of the
distribution of rights or resources flowing from it.194 Similarly, these
responses also call into question the idea posited in the procedural
justice literature that participants in adjudicative processes view the
fairness of that process as separate and distinct from their interest in
achieving a favorable outcome. To the contrary, most of the named
plaintiffs in this study view process and favorable outcome as one and
the same; i.e., the process is fair because it leads to a favorable result.195
Rather than believing that fair processes produce fair results, named
plaintiff believe that successful results and fair procedures are
synonymous.
The close correlation between result and perceptions of fairness
revealed in this study also calls into question the applicability of the
process control theory in the class action context. The central tenet of
that theory holds that disputants evaluate the fairness of a given process
by the extent to which it allows them to control the development and

192. Interview 30039, supra note 76.
193. Interview 30038, supra note 78.
194. See Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 14, at 90-91.
195. Because few named plaintiffs expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the case, it is
difficult based on this study to determine the extent to which dissatisfied named plaintiffs similarly
conflate fairness and result. Nevertheless, as noted above, the two named plaintiffs who expressed
dissatisfaction with the result felt that the process was fair.
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selection of information that will be used to resolve the dispute.196 As a
general matter, named plaintiffs have far less control over the
information and other factors relevant to the resolution of a class action
than do plaintiffs in individual cases. As we saw earlier in this article,
many of the named plaintiffs, as well as many lawyers, were keenly
aware of this lack of control over (and involvement in) the process.
Indeed, even the manner in which some named plaintiffs characterized
the positive result of the case further illustrates the detachment they felt,
even though they served as class representative:
They won a huge settlement.197
They won. And I got more money than I’d thought.198

It is not entirely clear whether the “they” to which these named
plaintiffs are referring is their lawyer or the rest of the class, but in either
case the term connotes a sense of distance between the named plaintiffs
and the result in the case. Thus, if many named plaintiffs feel removed
from the kind of control that typically leads to satisfaction with a
disputing process, why did the overwhelming number of named
plaintiffs in this study nevertheless feel that the litigation process in their
class action was fair? As noted above, this was no doubt due in part to
the conflation of result and perceptions of fairness. Moreover, as Alan
Erbsen suggests, given the choice between some control (i.e., less than
they would experience as a plaintiff in an individual lawsuit) and no
control whatsoever (i.e., as an absent class member), named plaintiffs
are content with the former.199 This contentment may be enhanced by
the relatively low cost of serving as a named plaintiff, combined with the
satisfaction that flows from being involved in a case that benefits a large
number of persons and, perhaps, society generally.
2. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Perceptions of Fairness
Most of the lawyers in this study took a similarly result-oriented
view towards the notion of process fairness. A few made the connection
explicitly:
Yeah, I think it was fair. We weren’t happy when the judge dismissed
the case at the front end. We thought that he wasn’t making the right

196.
197.
198.
199.
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See Erbsen, supra note 1, at 1008 n.17.
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decision, which is why we appealed. Ultimately, the litigation process
worked the way it should; we won on appeal. The case was resolved
in a way that was favorable to our client.200
I thought it was fair . . . . [T]he . . . judge that was assigned to the case
was very conscientious, and stayed on top of the case, and knew what
it was about, and took a very active interest in the case. I suppose my
view is always colored by the fact that . . . we got a decent settlement
and a good result.201
As to this case in particular, there was nothing that was unfair. To the
extent that anything was actually litigated, it was handled
expeditiously and turned out well.202
I thought we did well. I thought the judge was OK. We got the right
rulings.203

The vast majority of lawyers answered the fairness question by
referring to the judge, but it was clear that a fair judge in their eyes was
one who ruled in favor of the class. As one lawyer put it, “The best facts
don’t mean anything if you have a hostile judge.”204 Thus, the lawyers’
responses included observations that the judge liked the case, was
sympathetic to the cause, was open to considering the plaintiff’s claims,
wanted justice to prevail, paid attention to the case, read the papers, took
the case seriously, and was knowledgeable and hard-working.
Only three lawyers discussed procedural issues in response to this
question: two said that the process was fair because both sides were able
to state their case or receive the discovery they desired;205 one
complained that there was insufficient time for discovery.206 This lack
of focus on procedure is noteworthy because, unlike the named plaintiffs
who made similarly few such comments, the lawyers were engaged with
the case on a regular and often intense basis. Nevertheless, nearly all of
the lawyers evaluated the fairness of the process according to its
outcome, rather than the procedural workings of the case.

200. Interview 30046, supra note 124.
201. Interview 1012, supra note 131.
202. Interview 1003, supra note 111 (class action against manufacturer of over-the-counter
cold remedy).
203. Interview 30017, supra note 123.
204. Interview 30020, supra note 110.
205. Telephone Interview 30022 (Mar. 9, 2009) (class action against health insurance company
for denial of claims); Interview 1009, supra note 138.
206. Interview 1011, supra note 116.
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The fairness responses of the lawyers also mirrored the named
plaintiffs’ in that several criticized unwarranted delays, although they
felt the process was nevertheless fair.207 Another notable way in which
the lawyers’ perception of fairness mirrored that of many named
plaintiffs was the sense that the consumer class action is a battle between
right and wrong, and that the litigation process was fair because it
permitted the “right” side to prevail:
Yes [it was fair]. No one was cheated. . . . [The defendant] did what
they should have done under the law. They admitted that they were in
error. Their depositions all admitted the same thing. And [the case]
accomplished a major, major social benefit.208
I think it was [fair] and I think we’ve made good law in the process,
not only for the employees of this company but we forced a lot of the
big companies to be prudent just because these cases have been settling
for a lot of money.209

The latter comment is also noteworthy because it ties fairness into
affecting the marketplace generally, not simply the conduct of the
defendant in a particular class action. This view is consistent with that
of several named plaintiffs who saw their case as an opportunity to
change the behavior of companies throughout a particular industry.
These comments also reflect a more general confidence in the class
action as the only way to reign in corporate excesses. Other attorneys
sounded the same theme:
I am very proud to be a class action attorney. It’s a powerful tool. I
know they are the only effective way to enforce the laws to protect my
clients. I will make sure that it is not abused. It is a remarkably
effective, efficient fair way the private bar is far more effective, when
they are given the proper tools.210

207. Interview 30017, supra note 123; Interview 1014, supra note 141; Interview 30018 (class
action against health insurance company for unlawful increase in premiums) (Oct. 26, 2008);
Interview 30014, supra note 61 (class action against insurance company for underwriting practices);
Interview 1009, supra note 138.
208. Interview 30047, supra note 62 (class action against home appliance manufacturer for
defective product). Interestingly, the named plaintiff in this case harbored no such altruistic visions
of the case and its outcome: “I just wanted my $100 back. I never thought about anyone else.”;
Interview 30036, supra note 77.
209. Telephone Interview 30048 (July 30, 2009) (class action against trustees of employee
benefit plan for breach of fiduciary duty).
210. Interview 30015, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 25, 2008) (class action against automobile credit
company for discriminatory credit policies).
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You see there are [two] types of controls for market misbehavior . . . .
One is regulatory, two is supply and demand, you know that so and so
is a thief if he doesn’t give you what he promises so people don’t go to
him. But as you know, neither of them is sufficient by itself. Every
one of the federal agencies that I’m aware of has said expressly in so
many words and repeatedly . . . that they simply don’t have enough
resources to do their job completely. It is very true. So, there is a very
important function in relying upon private attorneys general.211

This shared sense that a class action is a battle between forces of
right and wrong is another example of the way in which, despite the
lesser quantity of lawyer-client communication in class actions (as
compared to individual cases), the quality of that communication may be
more effective, as lawyers and clients mutually reinforce the idea that
the lawsuit is about more than individual financial recovery. It also
demonstrates that whereas communication between lawyers and clients
in individual cases continually narrows both lawyer and client goals as
time progresses, lawyer-client communication continues to emphasize
broader causes.
On the other hand, at least a few attorneys are cynical about the
potential of class actions—and litigation in general—to bring about any
kind of meaningful social change:
The whole court system is way too slow. I think in the context of
litigation I thought we did well. I thought the judge was OK. We got
the right rulings. But you have to invest a lot of time and money to go
after these people and in the end I’m not quite sure what you
accomplish except to swat at one in an hundred thousand flies out
there.212
I certainly don’t think much of the judicial system or the process . . . . I
can’t really complain because, you know, I’m making a living from it
and it’s interesting and I feel like we are doing stuff that’s worth while
but you know, it’s pretty much just throwing sand against the tide.213

3. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Views of Named Plaintiffs’ Perceptions of
Fairness
While most of the lawyers were willing to speculate as to their
client’s goals and level of satisfaction with the result of the case, fewer
were willing to opine about their client’s view of the fairness of the class
211. Interview 30022, supra note 205.
212. Interview 30017, supra note 123.
213. Interview 1007, supra note 109.
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action process. Many assumed that their clients thought it was fair, but
offered no reason to support that assumption. Perhaps this is because it
is more difficult to project an assessment of fairness onto another than it
is to assume that they are satisfied with the result of a lawsuit.
Nevertheless, among those willing to offer an opinion (about half of the
lawyers), the majority speculated that the named plaintiffs thought it was
fair because of the result in the case. Interestingly, a larger number of
lawyers answered this question in a negative fashion than was the case
with respect to their speculation about client satisfaction with the result.
Four lawyers said that the named plaintiff felt that the case took too
long.214 One speculated that the client may have felt it was unfair
because she did not receive the injunctive relief sought.215 Two
suggested that the named plaintiffs would say that at least one part of the
process was unfair: their deposition.216 As one of these lawyers, whose
class action involved several named plaintiffs suing a credit card
company for abusive debt collection practices, noted:
I think some of them anyway, I know, did not think that the deposition
process was fair. They felt it was terrible and unfair for them to be
deposed for a full day and questioned in a way that they felt was
abusive . . . . They thought that they were being asked questions that
had nothing to do with the case. They thought that they were being
asked questions that they couldn’t possibly have remembered. And
about things they couldn’t possibly have remembered. Or questions
that suggested that they weren’t telling the truth. That they were at
fault when they didn’t feel that they were at fault.217

In contrast, none of the named plaintiffs (including the named
plaintiff represented by the lawyer who made the statement above) cited
their deposition as contributing to their assessment of the fairness of the
process. Although one named plaintiff did complain about her
deposition, she saw that as separate from her overall evaluation of
process fairness.218

214.
note 29.
215.
216.
217.
218.
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Interview 1005, supra note 143; Interview 1015, supra note 121; Interview 30044, supra
Interview 30023, supra note 115.
Interview 1002, supra note 111; Interview 30012, supra note 114.
Interview 30012, supra note 114.
Interview 1018, supra note 74.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This study suggests that several central tenets of the dispute
transformation and procedural justice literature either do not apply or
should be modified in the class action context. For example, while the
plaintiffs’ lawyers in this study conditioned named plaintiffs on “legal
system realities,” the reality they projected to their clients was an
expanded view of remedies, rather than the narrow, money-based vision
that lawyers in individual cases typically present to their clients.219 To
the extent that the named plaintiffs were unaware of either the
widespread effect of the harm they had suffered individually, or of the
potential for class actions to provide large-scale non-monetary relief, the
attorneys transformed their dispute, though in a very different way than
lawyers in individual cases. Rather than suppressing their clients’ “aims
of principle,” these lawyers consciously and transparently cultivated and
encouraged such aims.
The lawyers’ underlying motivation for this transformation is the
same as in individual cases: to maximize the chances of a successful
result. Named plaintiffs who lack a broad vision of what the class action
can offer, or who tire of litigation delays, are more likely to be tempted
by individual settlement offers that can derail an otherwise meritorious
class action. Yet the effect of the transformation is very different: the
named plaintiffs who undergo it exhibit a more hopeful view of the legal
system than most individual plaintiffs. Thus, while Felstiner and Sarat
found that many plaintiffs in materially successful individual cases are
nevertheless disappointed with the legal system because their “extralegal” goals remain unfulfilled, nearly all of the named plaintiffs in this
study—including those whose cases ended unsuccessfully—expressed
satisfaction with the litigation process itself.
This distinction is likely attributable to several factors. The broader
relief attainable through class actions is more likely to satisfy the nonmonetary goals of many named plaintiffs. Indeed, many named
plaintiffs see the class action as a vehicle for attaining “extra-legal”
remedies, such as changes in corporate behavior throughout a particular
industry. Moreover, class actions appeal to named plaintiffs’ conception
of right versus wrong, allowing them to interpret a successful result as
more than a monetary payout, but rather a moral victory, a triumph for
“the little guy” over corporate excess. And while there were too few
materially unsuccessful cases in this study to say for sure, one suspects

219. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4.
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that even in such cases, named plaintiffs nevertheless feel a sense of
pride in having taken a stand against a corporation that was, in their
view, abusing many people. Further, as Garth’s earlier study on class
actions suggests, the role of named plaintiff itself provides a sense of
importance and empowerment, transcending the material result in the
case.220
In a related vein, the data collected for this study reveal no
correlation between the level of named plaintiff involvement in the
litigation and their sense of empowerment. While nearly all of the
named plaintiffs had little engagement with, or control over, the case
that bore their name, many nevertheless felt a significant level of
personal satisfaction and pride with the result. Indeed, in an ironic twist,
it was one of the few activist named plaintiffs, whom one would expect
to be most involved in the case and thus empowered by the successful
result, who stated that “They [i.e., not “We”] won a huge settlement.”221
In addition, one of the named plaintiffs who felt most encouraged and
empowered by the result, feeling that her efforts resulted in a change in
industry practices, reported that she never had to go to court, didn’t have
much communication with her attorney, and “the lawyers handled
things.”222 Thus, at least in consumer class actions (a sub-group not
covered in Garth’s study) named plaintiff satisfaction and empowerment
seem to have little to do with extent of involvement and control. The
relief obtained, and the scope of that result, seem to be far more
important contributors to these positive reactions to the experience of
being a named plaintiff. In this way, many named plaintiffs in consumer
class actions resemble those potential claimants who rejected payments
from the 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund, to whom “litigation
represents more . . . than a means to satisfying private material ends; it
represents principled participation in a process that is constitutive of a
community.”223
The paramount importance of the result in the eyes of named
plaintiffs also contradicts the central tenet of the process control theory,
which holds that disputants evaluate a given dispute resolution
procedure according to the amount of control it affords them over the
development and selection of information used to resolve the dispute.224
The interviews of named plaintiffs and lawyers alike reveal that the
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
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former have far less control over the development and selection of
information used to resolve the dispute than plaintiffs in individual
cases. Nevertheless, these same named plaintiffs expressed far more
satisfaction with the fairness of the process than has been reported in
studies of plaintiffs in individual cases.
Moreover, the findings of this study contrast with those analyzing
individual cases across a variety of substantive areas that perceptions of
fairness depend as much, if not more, on process characteristics than on
whether disputants “won” the dispute. On the contrary, perceptions of
fairness among the named plaintiffs in this study were overwhelmingly
linked to the result of the case, at least when that case ended
successfully. Because the number of named plaintiffs interviewed about
unsuccessful cases was too small, it is impossible to speculate as to
whether this pattern holds true when the plaintiffs lose.
In another departure from the findings in some of the literature on
disputing behavior, the lawyers in this study were generally attuned to
their clients’ complex and overlapping array of goals. They also
recognized that those goals sometimes became more oriented toward
collective justice as the case endured. This contrasts with, for example,
Relis’ finding that plaintiffs’ lawyers in medical malpractice cases tend
to view their clients’ goals as remaining consistent (and primarily
centered on money) throughout the course of the lawsuit.225 Of course,
this heightened awareness of named plaintiffs’ goals among class action
lawyers is largely the result of the way in which the lawyers encourage
and nurture those very goals.
Ultimately, this study suggests that named plaintiffs are no different
from individual plaintiffs in at least one key respect: they want justice
done. They want an accounting for the defendant’s behavior and see
litigation as the necessary means to that end. And they are happy to
allow their lawyers to seek that accounting. What distinguishes the
litigation experience for most named plaintiffs, however, is that they are
encouraged by their lawyers to maintain and expand these justiceseeking goals, rather than narrow them. As a result, they are likely to
have a more favorable view of the litigation process, and of lawyers,
than individual plaintiffs, regardless of the outcome of the case.

225. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4.
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APPENDIX A—QUESTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS
1. Please provide a brief overview of a class action that is now
closed in which you represented a class of plaintiffs. In your answer,
please include:
The name of the case;
The approximate size of the class;
The duration of the lawsuit, from filing to resolution.
2. As plaintiffs’ counsel in this case, what were your goals when
you filed this lawsuit?
3. On a scale of 1-10, with 1 being attorneys’ fees and 10 being the
desire for some kind of larger social good, where would you place your
motivation for filing this lawsuit?
4. Did your goals change during the course of this lawsuit?
5. Please give a brief summary of the facts and legal claims in this
lawsuit (if not already provided in response to an earlier question).
6. Please describe the nature of the relief sought in this lawsuit (if
not already provided in response to an earlier question).
7. Why do you think the named plaintiff(s) filed this lawsuit?
8. Did the named plaintiff(s)’ reasons for filing this lawsuit change
during the course of the lawsuit? If so, why?
9. Did you ever sense that your goals in litigating this lawsuit
differed from your clients’ goals? And if so, what—if anything—did
you do about that?
10. How frequently did you discuss this lawsuit with the named
plaintiffs while the case was ongoing? In general, how would you
describe the substance of those conversations?
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11. What was the result of this lawsuit, and were you satisfied with
that result? Why or why not?
12. Leaving aside the actual result of this lawsuit, do you feel that
the litigation process itself was fair in this lawsuit? Why or why not?
13. Do you think the class representative(s) in this lawsuit were
satisfied with the result of the lawsuit? Why or why not?
14. Leaving aside the actual result of this lawsuit, do you think that
the named plaintiffs felt that the litigation process itself was fair in this
lawsuit? Why or why not?
15. As a general matter, how do you decide whether a potential
named plaintiff in a class action would be a suitable class representative?
16. As a general matter, during the course of a lawsuit, do you
speak more frequently, less frequently, or the same amount with your
clients in class actions or individual cases? Why do you think this is so?
17. If you could change the class action procedure in any way,
what, if anything would you change?
Ask for contact information from named plaintiffs.
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APPENDIX B—QUESTIONS FOR NAMED PLAINTIFFS
1. Please provide a brief overview of the class action entitled
[NAME OF CLASS ACTION DISCUSSED BY THEIR ATTORNEY
IN PRIOR INTERVIEW] in which you served as a named plaintiff. In
your answer, please include:
The approximate size of the class;
The duration of the lawsuit, from filing to resolution.
2. What were your goals when you filed this lawsuit?
3. On a scale of 1-10, with 1 being a monetary award and 10 being
the desire for some kind of larger social good, where would you place
your motivation for filing this lawsuit?
4. Where would you place your lawyer on this spectrum?
5. Did your goals change during the course of this lawsuit? If so,
why do you think this happened?
6. Please give a brief summary of the facts and legal claims in this
lawsuit (if not already provided in response to an earlier question).
7. Please describe the nature of the relief sought in this lawsuit (if
not already provided in response to an earlier question).
8. Did you ever feel that your goals in pursuing this lawsuit
differed from your lawyers’ goals? And if so, what—if anything—did
you do about that?
9. How frequently did you discuss this lawsuit with your lawyer
while this lawsuit was ongoing? In general, how would you describe the
substance of those conversations?
10. What was the result of this lawsuit, and were you satisfied with
that result? Why or why not?
11. Leaving aside the actual result of the lawsuit, do you feel that
the litigation process itself was fair in your lawsuit? Why or why not?
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12. If you could change the class action procedure in any way,
what, if anything would you change?
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